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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1965, one year after Surgeon General Luther Terry  
released a landmark report on the health hazards of smoking,1 
more than 42% of American adults were current smokers.2  In 
2015, after a half-century of efforts to reduce tobacco use, that 
number was down to just over 15%.3  Tobacco control is considered 
to be among the greatest public health successes of the twentieth 
century4  but there is still much work to be done.  Tobacco control 
advocates warn that “[e]ach day, about 2,500 kids in the United 
States try their first cigarette; and another 400 additional kids 
under 18 years of age become new regular, daily smokers.”5  The 
effects of nicotine addiction set in very quickly, with symptoms 
“often occur[ing] only weeks or even just days after youth  
‘experimentation’ with smoking first begins.”6  The majority of  
tobacco users say they want to quit, but in addition to addiction, 
many face barriers such as lack of social support and inadequate 
access to cessation aids and counseling.7 
 
 1.  U.S. Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare, Smoking and Health: Report of the 
Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service, PUB. HEALTH 
SERV. PUB.  NO. 1103, at 7-8 (1964), https://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/access/nnbbmq.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PCH3-UMEH].  
 2.  U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., The Health Consequences of Smoking—
50 Years of Progress: A Report of the Surgeon General 720 (2014), https://www.sur-
geongeneral.gov/library/reports/50-years-of-progress/full-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RF2Z-T5KD]. 
 3.  Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention, Current Cigarette Smoking Among 
Adults—United States, 2005–2016, 65 MORTALITY & MORBIDITY WKLY. REP. 1205 
(Nov. 11, 2016). 
 4.  See, e.g., Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention, Achievements in Public 
Health, 1900-1999: Tobacco Use—United States, 1990-1999, 48 MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 986, 986-88 (Nov. 5, 1999). 
 5.  Laura Bach, Smoking and Kids, CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, (Jan. 
12, 2017), (citing Substance Abuse and Mental Health Servs. Admin., Results from the 
2015 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Detailed Tables Table 4.14A (Sept. 8, 
2016), https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUH-DetTabs-2015/NSD 
UH-DetTabs-2015/NSDUH-DetTabs-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/YYC5-CXJ8]. 
 6. Bach, supra note 5, at 1 (citing Joseph R. DiFranza et al., Initial Symptoms of 
Nicotine Dependence in Adolescents, TOBACCO CONTROL (Apr. 14, 2000), http://tobac-
cocontrol.bmj.com/content/tobaccocontrol/9/3/313.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XF7-
G7GX]).  
 7.  Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention, Quitting Smoking Among Adults—
United States, 2001-2010, 60 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1513, 1513, 1515-
16,1518 (Nov. 11, 2011); U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Treating Tobacco Use 
and Dependence: 2008 Update  2-3 (2008) (concluding that cessation services and aids 
increase the odds of successful cessation), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ 
books/NBK63952/; [https://perma.cc/8EDU-X2AF]; cf. D. Kotz et al., Explaining the 
Social Gradient in Smoking Cessation: It’s Not in the Trying, But in the Succeeding, 
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The success of tobacco control is widely attributed to a  
strategy referred to as denormalization.8  The strategic  
association of negative social norms with tobacco companies,  
products, use, and users is readily apparent in counter-marketing 
campaigns that depict the industry as predatory and  
manipulative, tobacco products as monstrously toxic, and tobacco 
use as cosmetically and socially risky.9  Warnings about stained 
teeth, wrinkled skin, bad breath, impotence, and loss of control 
are highly visible,10 but law also plays an important role in  
denormalization.  Laws regulating tobacco products and  
advertising constrain industry efforts to make them appear  
appealing, appropriate, and desirable, especially for young 
teens.11  Laws prohibiting smoking in bars, restaurants,  
workplaces, and other public spaces serve multiple goals.  They 
protect bystanders from exposure to secondhand smoke, make 
smoking less convenient for smokers, and make nonsmokers and 
those who are trying to quit less likely to view smoking as a  
 
TOBACCO CONTROL 43, 46 (Oct. 20, 2008),   
http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/18/1/43.full [https://perma.cc/2Y6A-3MGA]  
(discussing socio-economic disparities in cessation success in England); Diana  
Williams Stewart, Predictors of Social Support Provided to Smokers 3, 4 (2008)  
(unpublished M.A. thesis, Louisiana State University),  
http://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1547&context=gradschool 
_theses [https://perma.cc/57VN-MD5B]. 
 8. See, e.g., Cal. Dep’t of Health Servs., A Model for Change: The California  
Experience in Tobacco Control 3 (1998) (“The California Tobacco Control Program has 
sought to . . . denormalize smoking and other tobacco use . . . Evaluation results  
indicate that this approach is working in California: people are smoking less and more 
people are protected from exposure to second-hand smoke.”), 
http://www.cdph.ca.gov/programs/tobacco/Docments/CDPH%20CTCP%20Refresh/ 
Policy/Social%20Norm%20Change/CTCPmodelforchange1998.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/Y843-5NH3]; Sei-Hill Kim & James Shanahan, Stigmatizing Smokers: Public  
Sentiment Toward Cigarette Smoking and its Relationship to Smoking Behaviors, 8 J. 
HEALTH COMM. 343, 360 (2003) (finding “that smoking rates are lower in the states 
where the public” sentiment toward smoking is more negative and “that smokers who 
have experienced unfavorable public sentiment are more willing to quit smoking than 
those who have not”); David Hammond et al., Tobacco Denormalization and Industry 
Beliefs Among Smokers from Four Countries, 31 AM. J. PREV. MED. 225, 229 (2006) 
(finding that people who perceive high levels of social denormalization of tobacco use 
are more likely to quit smoking); Benjamin Alamar & Stanton A. Glantz, Effect of  
Increased Social Unacceptability of Cigarette Smoking on Reduction in Cigarette  
Consumption, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1359, 1362 (2006) (finding that states where 
smoking is socially unacceptable have lower rates of smoking and concluding that 
“[t]obacco control programs should . . . reinforce the nonsmoking norm”).  
 9.  See infra Part II.B. 
10.  Id.  
11.  See infra Part II.A-B. 
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normal part of adult life.12  Lawmakers sometimes argue that  
allowing or encouraging employers, insurers, and landlords to  
discriminate against tobacco users will prompt users to quit and 
discourage others from starting.13 
Tobacco denormalization has generated significant litigation 
over the scope of government authority to regulate tobacco  
manufacturers, sellers, users, and other parties (e.g., employers, 
health insurers, and landlords).14  Existing constitutional  
precedents and statutory protections do little to constrain tobacco 
denormalization.  Constitutional freedom of speech protections for 
tobacco companies, which impose the only firm limit on tobacco 
control in the United States, create perverse incentives for  
regulators.15  Statutory protections for tobacco users vary from 
state to state and are inadequate to address social exclusion, bias, 
and many forms of overt discrimination.16  Open questions  
remain, however, that will shape tobacco denormalization efforts 
in the future.17 
Tobacco denormalization also raises ethical and political 
questions that scholars, policymakers, and consumer advocates 
have debated for more than a decade.18  Is it legitimate for the 
state to promote abstinence from tobacco use as part of a  
particular conception of the good life?  Even if discouraging  
tobacco use is an acceptable goal, is it acceptable for government 
to encourage social exclusion and discrimination against tobacco 
users?  Even if denormalization was appropriate at a time when 
a large proportion of the population used tobacco, should it be 
reevaluated in light of the potential effect of anti-tobacco bias on 
the socially disadvantaged groups who are more likely to be  
current smokers?  Are the negative effects of denormalization on 
tobacco users who are unable or unwilling to quit (e.g., loss of  
 
12.  See infra Part II.E. 
13.  See infra Part II.F. 
14.  See infra Part III.A. 
15.  Id. 
16.  Id. 
17.  Id. 
18.  Scott Burris, Disease Stigma in U.S. Public Health Law, 30 J. L. MED. & 
ETHICS 179, 187 (2002) [hereinafter Burris (2002)]; Scott Burris, Stigma and the Law, 
367 THE LANCET 529, 529-30 (2006) [hereinafter Burris (2006)]; Scott Burris, Stigma, 
Ethics and Policy: A Commentary on Bayer’s “Stigma and the Ethics of Public Health: 
Not Can We but Should We?, 67 J. SOC. SCI. & MED. 473, 475 (2008) [hereinafter Burris 
(2008)]; Kim & Shanahan, supra note 8, at 343; Tamar M.J. Antin et al., Tobacco 
Denormalization as a Public Health Strategy: Implications for Sexual and Gender  
Minorities, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2426, 2426 (2015). 
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social status, employment, insurance, or housing) outweighed by 
the positive effects for former users (who are encouraged to quit) 
and non-users (who are protected from secondhand smoke and  
influenced by social norms that make it less likely they will take 
up tobacco use themselves)?  Extralegal frameworks based on  
liberal, libertarian, utilitarian, egalitarian, and communitarian 
notions of justice provide varying answers to these questions.  In 
turn, these answers may inform lawmakers as they consider  
reform proposals and judges and regulators as they consider  
questions of constitutional and statutory interpretation raised by 
tobacco denormalization. 
Critics sometimes use a harsher term, stigmatization, to  
describe the intentional use of social disapproval to influence  
tobacco use.19  Choice of this term conveys skepticism about the 
acceptability of tobacco denormalization.  Indeed, public health 
ethicists and legal scholars debate whether the bias, social  
exclusion, and discrimination experienced by tobacco users 
amounts to true stigma.  In the view of some critics, a “stigma’s 
decentralized and visceral mode of social control” renders its  
intentional use as a public health tool flatly unethical.20  True 
stigmatization of a health condition (e.g., HIV), health-related  
behavior (e.g., injection drug use), or status (e.g., men who have 
sex with men) is a detriment to health at the individual and  
population level.21  It calls for a very different public health  
strategy, destigmatization, which aims to protect individuals from 
 
19.  See, e.g., Kirsten Bell et al., Smoking, Stigma and Tobacco 'Denormalization': 
Further Reflections on the Use of Stigma as a Public Health Tool. A Commentary on 
Social Science & Medicine’s Stigma, Prejudice, Discrimination and Health Special  
Issue (67:3), 70 SOC. SCI. & MED. 795, 795-96 (2010); Kirsten Bell et al., ‘Every Space 
is Claimed’: Smokers’ Experiences of Tobacco Denormalisation, 32 SOC. HEALTH & 
ILLNESS 914, 922 (2010), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-
9566.2010.01251.x/pdf [https://perma.cc/ZYC2-S6XJ].  
20.  Burris (2008), supra note 18. 
21.  See, e.g., World Summit of Ministers of Health, London Declaration on AIDS 
Preventions, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 2 (Jan. 28, 1988), http://apps.who.int/iris/bit-
stream/10665/60718/1/WHO_GPA_INF_88.6.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7XD-8JL4]  
(“Discrimination against, and stigmatization of, HIV-infected people and people with 
AIDS and population groups undermine public health and must be avoided.”); Ronald 
Bayer & Jennifer Stuber, Tobacco Control, Stigma and Public Health: Rethinking the 
Relations, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 47, 48 (2006) (noting that in a 1987 address to the 
United Nations General Assembly, Jonathan Mann, director of the World Health  
Organization’s Global Program on AIDS, “underscored the significance of  
stigmatization and the social and political unwillingness to face the epidemic as being 
‘as central to the global AIDS challenge as the disease itself’”); (citing Richard Parker 
& Peter Aggleton, HIV and AIDS-Related stigma and discrimination; a conceptual 
framework and implications for action, 57 SOC. SCI. & MED. 13, 13 (2003)).  
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stigma through privacy and antidiscrimination protections.22 
In their groundbreaking work on healthism, Jessica Roberts 
and Elizabeth Weeks Leonard have waded into this debate.23   
Although their focus is on health-status discrimination more 
broadly, they frequently discuss tobacco control strategies as  
examples.  They point to employer “bans on hiring nicotine users” 
(as distinguished from bans on smoking in the workplace) as  
“paradigmatic healthist conduct.”24  On the other hand, they  
argue, “participation-based, employee smoking-cessation  
programs” are “an easy case of a non-healthist policy that  
discriminates based on health status.25  Their framework for  
distinguishing between the two (and between other forms of 
“‘good’ and ‘bad’ health-status differentiations”26) relies on several 
factors, including whether the differentiation “[i]s driven by  
animus,” and whether it “[s]tigmatizes individuals unfairly, 
[p]unishes people for their private conduct, [i]mpedes access to 
health care, [c]uts off resources or otherwise limits the ability to 
adopt healthy life choices, [p]roduces worse health outcomes, or 
[m]aintains or increases existing disparities.”27 
In this commentary, I demarcate the value added by the  
Roberts and Leonard anti-healthism framework by comparing it 
to alternative frameworks for assessing the legal, ethical, and  
political issues raised by tobacco denormalization.  In Part II, I  
describe current and potential tobacco denormalization  
strategies.  In Part III, I introduce four frameworks for assessing 
tobacco denormalization strategies: (1) constitutional doctrines 
and statutes that secure the liberty of tobacco manufacturers,  
 
22.  See Scott Burris, Law and the Social Risk of Health Care: Lessons from HIV 
Testing, 61 ALB. L. REV.  831, 835-36 (1998) (describing the destigmatization strategy 
for HIV as entailing the adoption of new legal frameworks “to protect people with HIV 
from discrimination in employment, housing, and public accommodations; . . . to  
protect HIV-related medical information; and . . . [to] protect medical privacy and limit 
HIV testing in the absence of informed consent” and “opposition to . . . coercive legal 
measures, such as mandatory testing and a whole range of criminal laws directed at 
conduct that was thought to contribute to the spread of the disease”).  
23.  See Jessica L. Roberts, “Healthism”: A Critique of the Antidiscrimination  
Approach to Health Insurance and Health-Care Reform, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1159 
(2012) [hereinafter Roberts (2012)]; Jessica L. Roberts, Healthism and the Law of  
Employment Discrimination, 99 IOWA L. REV. 571 (2014) [hereinafter Roberts (2014)]; 
Jessica L. Roberts & Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, What is (and isn’t) Healthism?, 50 GA. 
L. REV. 833 (2016) [hereinafter Roberts & Leonard (2016)]. 
24.  Roberts & Leonard (2016), supra note 23, at 846, 896. 
25.  Id. at 900. 
26.  Id. at 896. 
27.  Id. at 895. 
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retailers, and users and protect them from discrimination; (2) the 
health justice framework I have developed to assess the use of law 
as a tool for reducing health disparities; (3) a critique advanced 
by Petr Skrabanek28 and others, which I will call libertarian anti-
healthism; and (4) the alternative vision of anti-healthism  
developed by Roberts and Leonard, which I will call egalitarian 
anti-healthism.  In Part IV, I compare the four frameworks  
described in Part III by applying them to each of the  
denormalization strategies described in Part II.  In Part V, I offer 
concluding reflections on the value added by the Roberts and 
Leonard framework and some suggestions for their ongoing devel-
opment of anti-healthism as a principle for assessing health care 
and public health policy. 
II. STRATEGIES FOR TOBACCO DENORMALIZATION 
Before assessing the legal, ethical, and political issues raised 
by various tobacco denormalization strategies, it is important to 
develop a common understanding about what denormalization is 
and a taxonomy of the various forms it may take.  The traditional 
epidemiological model of agent, host, vector, and environment29 
offers a useful starting point. According to this model, patterns of 
tobacco-related disease are produced by the interaction of a host 
(a consumer of tobacco products, potential consumer, or  
bystander) with the agent of disease (tobacco products and smoke) 
within an environment (which is shaped by social, cultural,  
economic, and legal factors).30  In this model, tobacco companies 
and their business practices act as the vectors of disease,  
spreading propaganda and misinformation in an effort to hook 
new consumers.31  Young teenagers are the target demographic—
for industry and public health officials alike. Virtually all tobacco 
users initiate their tobacco use and become regular users in their 
teen years.32  Accordingly, a person who does not start tobacco use 
 
28.  See PETR SKRABANEK, THE DEATH OF HUMANE MEDICINE AND THE RISE OF 
COERCIVE HEALTHISM (1994) [hereinafter Skrabanek (1994)]. 
29.  LEON GORDIS, EPIDEMIOLOGY 19 (5th ed. 2014). 
30.  C. TRACY ORLEANS & JOHN SLADE, NICOTINE ADDICTION: PRINCIPLES AND 
MANAGEMENT ix (1993).  
31.  Dirk Hanson, The Tobacco Industry as Disease Vector, ADDICTION INBOX 2 
(May 26, 2012), http://addiction-dirkh.blogspot.com/2012/05/tobacco-industry-as-dis-
ease-vector.html [https://perma.cc/K95B-YE76]. 
32.  U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv.’s, Substance Abuse & Mental Health 
Administration, National Survey on Drug Use & Health 2014 (2014), 
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NAHDAP/studies/36361/version/1 
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prior to adulthood is unlikely to ever take it up.33 
Denormalization alters the social environment in which  
consumers and potential consumers make choices about tobacco 
use.  Here, I will focus on seven types of tobacco control  
interventions that influence social norms: (1) taxes that increase 
the cost of tobacco products; (2) regulations that targets tobacco 
products as the agent of disease; (3) marketing restrictions that 
target tobacco companies as vectors; (4) counter-marketing  
campaigns sponsored by government and nongovernmental  
organizations; (5) laws requiring tobacco companies and retailers 
to display warnings on product packaging, advertisements, or at 
the point of sale; (6) smoke-free laws prohibiting users from  
smoking in particular locations; and (7) laws permitting,  
encouraging, or requiring discrimination against tobacco users.  It 
is important to emphasize that policymakers and public health 
officials have adopted many of these interventions without  
explicitly intending to denormalize tobacco.34  Indeed, each of the 
interventions discussed here serves other purposes beyond  
denormalizing tobacco companies, use, and users.  For some of 
them, the effect on social norms is incidental to other effects, such 
as increasing the economic cost of tobacco. 
A. Tobacco Taxes 
Federal, state, and local taxes on tobacco products reduce 
consumption significantly, especially among teenagers and young 
adults.35  In 2009, for example, when Congress raised the federal 
tax on cigarettes after a long period of stagnation, researchers 
documented an immediate impact on teen smoking.  One month 
after the tax went into effect, “the percentage of middle and high 
 
[https://perma.cc/H9SW-3WLW]; See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Preventing 
Tobacco Use Among Youth and Young Adults: A Report of the Surgeon General 101 
(2012), https://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/reports/preventing-youth-tobacco-
use/full-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/QG69-E9EE].  
33.  Dennis Thompson, Jr., Teens and Smoking, EVERYDAY HEALTH (July 13, 
2011), http://www.everydayhealth.com/smoking-cessation/understanding/smoking-
and-teens.aspx [https://perma.cc/X8SD-PSGC]. 
34.  As Ronald Bayer has described, “those who smoked [became] targets of public 
health policies that at first inadvertently but then explicitly sought to utilize the power 
of denormalization and marginalization to reduce tobacco consumption.” Ronald 
Bayer, Stigma and the Ethics of Public Health: Not Can We But Should We, 67 SOC. 
SCI. & MED. 463, 466 (2008) (emphasis added).  
35.  See, e.g., Frank J. Chaloupka, Macro-Social Influences: The Effects of Prices 
and Tobacco Control Policies on the Demand for Tobacco Products, 1 NICOTINE & 
TOBACCO RES. S105, S105-07 (1999).  
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school students who reported smoking in the [previous] thirty 
days [had] dropped by 10 percent, . . . resulting in a quarter of a 
million fewer . . . smokers[.]”36  The current federal tax on  
cigarettes is $1.01 per pack.37  State taxes vary considerably  
depending on political preferences about taxation and the  
influence of the tobacco industry, ranging from $4.35 per pack in 
New York to $0.30 per pack in Virginia.38  “[M]ore than 600 local 
jurisdictions” also tax cigarettes.39  These taxes are cumulative.  
For example, the combined federal, state, county, and city taxes 
amount to $7.17 per pack in Chicago.40 
So called “sin taxes” increase the financial cost of targeted 
goods and services, while also signaling social disapproval.41  
Other excise taxes may have a more direct effect on social norms. 
Taxes on disposable shopping bags, for example, are applied at 
check-out in a way that is highly visible to the consumer and  
others who might be watching.42  Still, even tobacco taxes applied 
in more subtle ways send a social signal.43  Bruce Carruthers has 
argued that taxation of “[l]egal but morally problematic” goods 
and services and earmarking of funds for “‘motherhood and apple 
pie’” projects like tobacco education can project “negative social 
meanings” associated with disfavored market activity.44 
B. Product Regulation 
Surprisingly few measures target tobacco products as agents 
of disease.  Flavor bans, such as the 2009 Tobacco Control Act’s 
 
36.  LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN & LINDSAY F. WILEY, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, 
DUTY, RESTRAINT 278 (3d ed. 2015) (citing Jidong Huang & Frank J. Chaloupka, The 
Impact of the 2009 Federal Tobacco Excise Tax Increase on Youth Tobacco Use, NAT’L 
BUREAU OF ECON. RES. (Working Paper No. 18026, 2012), http://www.nber.org/pa-
pers/w18026.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9WT-ZCEX]). 
37.  Ann Boonn, Top Combined State-Local Cigarette Tax Rates, CAMPAIGN FOR 
TOBACCO-FREE KIDS (Nov. 17, 2016), http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/fact-
sheets/pdf/0267.pdf [https://perma.cc/UTH3-UYQR].  
38.  Ann Boonn, State Cigarette Excise Tax Rates & Rankings, CAMPAIGN FOR 
TOBACCO-FREE KIDS (Jan. 3, 2017), https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/fact-
sheets/pdf/0097.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KZT-ANQH]. 
39.  Boonn, supra note 38. 
40.  Id. 
41.  Bruce G. Carruthers, The Semantics of Sin Tax: Politics, Morality, and Fiscal 
Imposition, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2565-66 (2016) (arguing that “negative social  
meanings can be projected through public revenue systems”). 
42.  GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 36, at 277 (discussing potential lessons of the 
social impact of bag taxes for public health taxes). 
43.  Carruthers, supra note 41, at 2565-66. 
44.  Id. 
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prohibition on flavored cigarettes,45 and state and local laws that 
prohibit additional flavors and products,46 are a notable  
exception.  Flavor bans are not aimed at rendering the agent less 
toxic.  Indeed, menthol, the one flavoring that research suggests 
may render tobacco products more lethal47 and addictive48 is  
currently exempted from the federal ban.49  Prohibiting fruit and 
 
45.  21 U.S.C. § 387g(a)(1)(A) (2012) (“[A] cigarette or any of its component parts 
(including the tobacco, filter, or paper) shall not contain, as a constituent (including a 
smoke constituent) or additive, an artificial or natural flavor (other than tobacco or 
menthol) or an herb or spice, including strawberry, grape, orange, clove, cinnamon, 
pineapple, vanilla, coconut, licorice, cocoa, chocolate, cherry, or coffee, that is a  
characterizing flavor of the tobacco product or tobacco smoke. Nothing in this  
subparagraph shall be construed to limit the Secretary's authority to take action under 
this section or other sections of this chapter applicable to menthol or any artificial or 
natural flavor, herb, or spice not specified in this subparagraph.”); At least some  
flavored tobacco products were previously prohibited under the Master Settlement 
Agreement, in which tobacco companies agreed that they would not market their  
products to youth, and under state and local laws in a few jurisdictions.  See Mitchell 
Hamline School of Law, Public Health Law Center, Flavored Products, PUB. HEALTH 
L. CTR. 1-2, http://publichealthlawcenter.org/topics/tobacco-control/sales-re-
strictions/flavored-products [https://perma.cc/UTD7-EMPU].  
46.  Mitchell Hamline School of Law, Public Health Law Center, Regulating  
Flavored Tobacco Products, PUB. HEALTH L. CTR. 1-2, (describing state and local  
restrictions on flavored tobacco products). http://publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/de-
fault/files/resources/tclc-guide-regflavoredtobaccoprods-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
C9R7-ESRP]  
47.  See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Tobacco Prod. Sci. Advisory Committee,  
Menthol Cigarettes and Public Health: Review of the Scientific Evidence and  
Recommendations 191, 206,  210, 217-18, (2011) (reviewing scientific evidence  
regarding disease risks associated with menthol versus non-menthol cigarettes and 
finding the evidence inconclusive), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Advisory 
Committees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/TobaccoProductsScientificAdvisory 
Committee/ UCM269697.pdf [https://perma.cc/P7CL-GVJ2]. 
48.  Id. at 225-26 (reviewing scientific evidence regarding the physiological effects 
of menthol cigarettes and finding sufficient evidence “to conclude that menthol has 
cooling and anesthetic effects that reduce the harshness of cigarette smoke” and “that 
it is biologically plausible that menthol makes cigarette smoking more addictive”).  
49.  Flavored Products, supra note 45, at 1.  In 2011, a report by FDA’s Tobacco 
Products Scientific Advisory Committee (TPSAC) found that while menthol cigarettes 
are no more toxic than unflavored cigarettes the anesthetic properties of menthol 
“could increase prevalence [of smoking] by increasing the rate of initiation and  
subsequent addiction and by more strongly maintaining addiction and reducing  
successful cessation.”  U.S. Food & Drug Admin., supra note 47, at 3, 25.  In 2013, FDA 
issued an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking to solicit input on regulating  
menthol cigarettes. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Invites Public Input on Menthol 
in Cigarettes 1, (July 23, 2013) http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/Press 
Announcements/ucm361966.htm [https://perma.cc/84EG-GC7T]. FDA regulation was  
delayed, however, by litigation initiated by tobacco companies alleging that the TPSAC 
report was invalid due to conflicts of interest.  In 2016, the D.C. Court of Appeals held 
that the FDA was permitted to rely on the TPSAC report.  R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. 
v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., No. 1:11-cv-00440 (D.C. Cir. 2016).  As of this writing, 
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candy flavorings does, however, render tobacco products less  
attractive to children and other potential new users.50 
The link between flavor bans and social norms is perhaps 
somewhat attenuated, but in addition to making tobacco products 
less appealing to children, flavor bans limit industry efforts to 
configure tobacco products in ways that suggest they are  
appropriate for children.  Tobacco companies intentionally design 
flavored products to be “obviously youth oriented” in the words of 
an internal RJ Reynolds memo from 1974.51  “‘This could involve 
cigarette name, blend, flavor and marketing technique . . . . For 
example, a flavor which would be candy-like but give the  
satisfaction of a cigarette.’”52  As intended, the idea that flavored 
products are socially appropriate for kids and teens has caught on 
among tobacco users.  For example, “[a] Lorillard report  
summarizing the test results from new cigarette flavors, included 
smokers’ description of ‘Tutti Frutti’ flavored cigarettes as ‘for 
younger people, beginner cigarette smokers, teenagers . . . when 
you feel like a light smoke, want to be reminded of bubblegum.’”53 
Bans on non-menthol flavorings for cigarettes are an  
important starting point for reducing youth smoking initiation.54  
However, they leave many candy-flavored tobacco products on the 
market, in addition to menthol cigarettes (an issue I’ll return to 
 
the FDA has not issued a proposed rule banning menthol.  In 2013, Chicago became 
the first jurisdiction to ban the sale of all flavors, including menthol. The ban survived 
constitutional  
challenges by tobacco retailers; Menthol in Cigarettes, Tobacco Products; Request for 
Comments, 78 Fed. Reg. 44484 (proposed July 24, 2013) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 
1140); Pub. Health L. Ctr., Chicago’s Regulation of Menthol Flavored Tobacco Products: 
A Case Study, TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, http://www.publichealthlaw-
center.org/sites/default/files/resources/tclc-casestudy-chicago-menthol-2015_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AZF2-45JS]. (last visited Mar. 31, 2017); 76 Enter., Inc. v. City of 
Chicago, No. 1:14-cv-08306, at 2-4 (N.D. Ill. 2014); Indep. Gas & Serv. Stations Ass’ns., 
Inc. v. City of Chicago, 112 F. Supp. 3d 749, 751-52, 754, 756-58 (N.D. Ill. 2015); see 
Michael Freiberg, The Minty Taste of Death: State and Local Options to Regulate  
Menthol in Tobacco Products, 64 CATH. U. L. REV. 949, 973-74 (2015). 
50.  See, e.g., G. Ferris Wayne & G. N. Connolly, How Cigarette Design Can Affect 
Youth Initiation into Smoking: Camel Cigarettes 1983–93, 11 TOBACCO CONTROL i32 
i35, i37-i38 (2002), http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i32.long 
[https://perma.cc/753C-9LXH].  
51.  Laura Bach, Flavored Tobacco Products Attract Kids, CAMPAIGN FOR 
TOBACCO-FREE KIDS 5 (Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/fact-
sheets/pdf/0383.pdf [https://perma.cc/284Y-9VBV].  
52.  Id. 
53.  Id. (quoting R.M. Manko Associates, Summary Report: New Flavors Focus 
Group Sessions (1978), https://www.industrydocumentslibrary.ucsf.edu/pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4C66-DJ8F]).  
54.  See, e.g., Wayne & Connolly, supra note 50, at i33, i35, i37-i38. 
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in Part III.A).  The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has, 
thus far, declined to prohibit candy-flavored smokeless tobacco 
(e.g., chewing tobacco and snus) or liquids for use in electronic 
cigarettes, (also known as e-cigarettes) and water pipes (also 
known as hookas).  Research suggests that the ubiquity of flavors 
designed to appeal to youth is contributing to the dramatic  
increase in e-cigarette and hooka use among children, teens, and 
young adults.55 
C. Advertising Restrictions 
Drawing on “‘vector analysis’ which first emphasized tobacco 
industry activities, rather than smokers’ individual behaviors, as 
critical for tobacco control,”56 denormalization emerged in direct 
response to industry marketing strategies that promote tobacco 
products as part of a socially desirable lifestyle.57  For more than 
a century, tobacco companies have used colorful package inserts 
and advertisements to associate their products with sports stars 
and other celebrities.58  Tobacco companies sponsor sports and  
entertainment events to “reinforce the imagery of the brand.”59  
Marketing campaigns target particular demographic groups— 
especially teens and young adults—by portraying tobacco use as 
a way to convey the user’s social status, lifestyle choices, political 
preferences, and more.60  Key advertising themes include that  
 
55.  M.B. Harrell et al., Flavored E-Cigarette Use: Characterizing Youth, Young 
Adult, and Adult Users, 5 PREVENTATIVE MED. REP. 33-34, 39 (2017) (noting that  
“flavors play a particularly prominent role” in e-cigarette initiation among youth and 
young adults, compared to adult users who initiate e-cigarette use to stop using  
conventional cigarettes).  Note, however, that e-cigarettes do not pose the same risks 
as conventional tobacco products.  See Wendy E. Parmet, Paternalism, Self- 
governance, and Public Health: The Case of E-Cigarettes, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 879, 924, 
952 (2016). 
56.  Ruth E. Malone et al., Tobacco Industry Denormalisation as a Tobacco  
Control Intervention: A Review, 21 TOBACCO CONTROL 162, 162 (2012) (quoting Von 
Eric LeGresley, A “Vector Analysis” of the Tobacco Epidemic, MEDICUS MUNDI 
SCHWEIZ 1, 3 (1999), http://www.medicusmundi.ch/de/bulletin/mms-bulletin/kampf-
dem-tabakkonsum/grundlagentexte-zur-tabakepidemie/a-vector-analysis-of-the-to-
bacco-epidemic [https://perma.cc/F6V4-WU5T]). 
57.  David Hammond et al., Tobacco Denormalization and Industry Beliefs Among 
Smokers From Four Countries, 31 AM. J. PREV. MED. 225, 225 (2006). 
58.  GERARD S. PETRONE, TOBACCO ADVERTISING: THE GREAT SEDUCTION 154-55 
(1996). 
59.  Speech by unknown author, RJ Reynolds Records (May 1989),  
available at https://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/jrkm0084. 
[https://perma.cc/Y63V-63GN]. 
60.  See, e.g., BARBARA S. LYNCH & RICHARD J. BONNIE, GROWING UP TOBACCO 
FREE: PREVENTING NICOTINE ADDICTION IN CHILDREN AND YOUTHS 105-06, 116, 120, 
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tobacco use is “an expression of independence, individualism, and 
social sophistication,”61 that “‘[t]obacco use is a rite of passage to 
adulthood[,]’” that “‘[s]uccessful, popular people use tobacco[,]’” 
and that “‘[t]obacco use is relaxing in social situations.’”62  Finally, 
“[b]y associating tobacco use with commonplace activities, events, 
social spaces, or mind-sets, advertising reassures users that 
smoking and chewing are normal, pervasive, and socially  
acceptable.”63 
Advertising restrictions are intended to reduce demand in 
part by constraining companies’ ability to market their products 
as a normal, socially desirable part of adult life.  The Public 
Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 banned television and  
radio ads for cigarettes and little cigars.64  The Family Smoking 
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 bans outdoor  
advertising within 1,000 feet of schools and playgrounds and  
prohibits sponsorship of sports and entertainment events, among 
other restrictions.65  The 2009 law also gave state and local  
governments more flexibility to enact time, place and manner  
restrictions on cigarette advertising.66  Many state and local  
governments have focused on imposing additional restrictions on 
outdoor and point-of-sale advertising.67 
Advertising restrictions reduce consumers’ and potential  
consumers’ exposure to tobacco marketing, which impacts a  
person’s attitudes about tobacco, likelihood of initiating tobacco 
use, number of quit attempts, and prevalence of use.68  For  
 
123 (1994). 
61.  Id. at 118. 
62.  Id. at 120 (emphasis omitted). 
63.  Id. at 121. 
64.  15 U.S.C. § 1335 (2012). 
65.  21 U.S.C. § 387a-1(2) (2012); Regulations Restricting the Sale and  
Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 
61 Fed. Reg. 44396 (proposed Aug. 28, 1996) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. Pt. 801, 803, 
804, 807, 820, 897). 
66.  15 U.S.C. § 1334(c) (2012) (“[A] State or locality may enact statutes and  
promulgate regulations, based on smoking and health . . . imposing specific bans or 
restrictions on the time, place, and manner, but not content, of the advertising or  
promotion of any cigarettes.”); see also Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets, Inc, v. City of 
Providence, 731 F.3d 71, 76-81, 85 (1st Cir. 2013) (discussing the legislative purpose 
of § 1334(c), which was intended to provide greater authority to state and local  
governments than had previously been granted by the Supreme Court). 
67.  See, e.g., Paul A. Diller, Why Do Cities Innovate in Public Health?  
Implications of Scale and Structure, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1219, 1226-27, 1233 (2014) 
(reviewing state and local restrictions on outdoor advertising). 
68.  See, e.g., Lisa Henriksen, Comprehensive Tobacco Marketing Restrictions: 
Promotion, Packaging, Price and Place, 21 TOBACCO CONTROL 147, 149 (2012). 
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example, longitudinal studies indicate that “within months after 
the [United Kingdom] banned [tobacco] advertising, . . . Fewer  
adolescents (ages 13-15) overestimated smoking prevalence 
among peers[,]” an important measure of tobacco  
denormalization.69  It is difficult to isolate the impact of  
advertising restrictions from other tobacco control measures, such 
as tax increases or minimum price laws, which are often  
implemented at the same time as advertising restrictions.  The 
few studies that have attempted to so isolate tobacco control 
measures suggest that only price increases are more effective 
than advertising restrictions in reducing the prevalence of tobacco 
use.70 
D. Counter-Marketing 
Marketing campaigns sponsored by government and  
nongovernmental organizations can be used to counter industry 
advertising by portraying tobacco products as unethical or  
unclean, tobacco companies as manipulative, and tobacco users as 
socially ostracized.71  Although health communications  
campaigns have long used mass media to convey messages about 
the health risks of tobacco use, more recent efforts against tobacco 
use prompt people “not only to avoid hazardous health  
consequences or legal sanctions (such as cigarette taxes), but also 
to escape from such psychological punishments as social isolation 
or embarrassment.”72  Campaigns highlighting the effects of  
tobacco use on appearance (wrinkled skin, yellow teeth) and  
sexual desirability (bad breath, impotence) are characteristic of 
the denormalization strategy.  For example, a campaign launched 
by the FDA in 2014 focused on cosmetic effects as well as other 
social costs like being pulled away from the school dance by the 
need to go outside to smoke, and the loss of control that  
 
69.  Id. 
70.  See, e.g., M. M. Schaap et al., Effect of Nationwide Tobacco Control Policies 
on Smoking Cessation in High and Low Educated Groups in 18 European Countries, 
17 TOBACCO CONTROL 248, 254 (2008); D. T. Levey et al., The Role of Tobacco Control 
Policies in Reducing Smoking and Deaths in a Middle Income Nation: Results from the 
Thailand SimSmoke Simulation Model, 17 TOBACCO CONTROL 53, 57 (2008). 
71.  U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Preventing Tobacco Use Among Youth 
and Young Adults: A Report of the Surgeon General, 635, 643, 669, 672 (2012), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK99237/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK99237.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7EP4-GGJK]. 
72.  Kim & Shanahan, supra note 8, at 349. 
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accompanies addiction.73  Messages aiming to denormalize  
tobacco use “do not try to persuade young adults they risk serious 
health problems in later life, but instead undermine the  
immediate social and psychological benefits they hope to access 
by smoking.”74  Evidence suggests that this approach is more  
effective than campaigns focusing solely on straightforward  
descriptions of health risks.75 
Some campaigns specifically target the tobacco industry and 
its practices.  For example, the “Truth Campaign” highlights  
internal industry documents describing deceptive marketing 
practices or denigrating consumers.76  In the words of the  
advertising executive who steered the campaign’s development, 
 
While rather counterintuitive, what made tobacco so 
alluring to youth was its deadly qualities . . . .  
Generations of well[-]intentioned social marketers 
had pounded the airwaves doing everything they 
could to explain that tobacco kills. What they did not 
understand (and the tobacco industry did) was that 
they risked actually making tobacco that much more 
appealing to youth . . . . [W]e surmised that we could 
not take away [teens’] tool of rebellion without  
giving them an alternative.  Attacking the duplicity 
and manipulation of the tobacco industry became 
“truth’s” rebellion.77 
 
73.  U.S. Food & Drug Admin., The Real Cost: Campaign Overview, THE CTR. FOR 
TOBACCO PRODS. (last updated March 2017), https://www.fda.gov/down-
loads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/AbouttheCen-
terforTobaccoProducts/PublicEducationCampaigns/TheRealCostCam-
paign/UCM384307.pdf; [https://perma.cc/9W6Q-KZSB]; Li-Ling Huang et al., Impact 
of The Real Cost Campaign on Adolescents’ Recall, Attitudes, and Risk Perceptions 
About Tobacco Use: A National Study, 14 INT’L. J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB. HEALTH 42, 42-
43 (2017); Brice, R.J. Cyler in “The Real Cost” Commercial, NO PINK SPANDEX (July 
29, 2016), http://awwman.com/ nps/main/2016/07/r-j-cyler-in-the-real-cost-commer-
cial/ [https://perma.cc/VA7R-JUUK]. 
74.  Janet Hoek et al., A Qualitative Exploration of Young Adult Smokers’  
Responses to Novel Tobacco Warnings, 13 BMC PUB. HEALTH 609, 610 (2013). 
75.  See, e.g., Huang et al., supra note 73, at 43; John Taylor et al., A Qualitative 
Evaluation of Novel Intervention Using Insight into Tobacco Industry Tactics to  
Prevent the Uptake of Smoking in School-aged Children, 16 BMC PUB. HEALTH 539, 
540 (2016). 
76.  Matthew C. Farrelly et al., The Influence of the National Truth Campaign® 
on Smoking Initiation, 36 AM. J. PREV. MED. 379 (2009); Amanda Kalaydjian  
Richardson et al., Evidence for Truth®: The Young Adult Response to a Youth-Focused 
Anti-Smoking Campaign, 39 AM. J. PREV. MED. 500, 500 (2010). 
77.  Jeffrey J. Hicks, The Strategy Behind Florida’s “Truth” Campaign, 10 
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These efforts, sometimes referred to as tobacco industry 
denormalization, are “associated with a decreased risk of smoking 
initiation,” reduced smoking prevalence, and increased quit  
attempts and intentions to quit.78  They may also contribute to 
political support for more stringent regulation of the tobacco  
industry.79 
E. Warning Mandates 
In 1965, shortly after the first Surgeon General’s report on 
smoking and health, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)  
promulgated a rule requiring that all tobacco advertisements  
include a warning about health hazards. A few years later,  
Congress preempted the FTC rule by enacting a warning mandate 
that applied to product packaging, but did not apply to  
advertisements.  Once a pioneer of tobacco control efforts, the U.S. 
has now fallen behind other countries, many of which have 
adopted large, graphic warning labels depicting the health and 
social consequences of tobacco use and urging tobacco users to 
quit.80  The black and white, text-only warnings that are used in 
the U.S. to convey the Surgeon General’s advice about smoking 
and health have not been updated in decades.  The 2009 Tobacco 
Control Act directed the FDA to develop graphic warnings that 
would occupy 50% of cigarette packs.81  As discussed below, the 
FDA withdrew its proposed warnings in 2013 after a circuit split 
emerged regarding their constitutionality under the Supreme 
Court’s evolving commercial speech jurisprudence. 
The graphic warnings proposed by the FDA focused on health 
effects, rather than social consequences, but the images were  
arresting enough to prompt one commentator to argue that they 
impose a “psychic tax” on tobacco users: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TOBACCO CONTROL 3, 4 (2001). 
78.  Farrelly et al., supra note 76, at 381-82; Malone et al., supra note 56, at 162, 
168; see, e.g., Debra H. Bernat et al., Adolescent Smoking Trajectories: Results from a 
Population-Based Cohort Study, 43 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 334, 337-40 (2008). 
79.  Malone, supra note 56, at 162, 169. 
80.  Gostin & Wiley, supra note 36, at 447-48. 
81.  15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1-2) (2012). 
WILEYFINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/28/17  7:20 PM 
2017] TOBACCO DENORMALIZATION 219 
[B]y making risks vivid and easy to imagine, graphic 
warnings may trigger an emotional response that 
textual warnings do not . . . . Marketing experts have 
long relied on classical conditioning to associate 
their products with positive emotions.  Graphic 
warnings may have the opposite effect. In other 
words, they may condition people to experience  
negative emotions when presented with a particular 
product . . . . [B]y manipulating feelings of guilt, 
graphic warnings may channel consumption choices 
in the direction that the government deems  
appropriate.82 
 
Graphic warning labels used in other countries are more 
clearly linked to denormalization, focusing on impotence as a 
health risk associated with smoking,83 warning that “smoking 
causes foul and offensive breath,”84 and depicting addiction with 
an image of a man behind bars made of cigarettes.85  Warning 
mandates place denormalization messages where government-
sponsored campaigns cannot reach: on product packaging.   
Research suggests that warning labels focusing on short-term  
social consequences are more effective in dissuading teens from 
smoking than warnings focused on health effects.86 
F. Smoke-Free Laws 
Smoke-free laws target individual smokers and potential 
smokers as the hosts of disease and as vectors for delivery of 
secondhand smoke to nonsmokers.  State and local jurisdictions 
regulate smokers directly by making smoking a civil offense.  For 
 
82.  Gary M. Lucas, Paternalism and Psychic Taxes: The Government’s Use of  
Negative Emotions to Save Us from Ourselves, 22 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 227, 254-55 
(2013). 
83.  P. Vateesatokit et al., Thailand: Wining Battles, But the War’s Far From Over, 
9 TOBACCO CONTROL 122, 123-24 (2000), http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/ 
tobaccocontrol/9/2/122.full.pdf; [https://perma.cc/Q33S-VQFE]; D. Hammond et al., 
Impact of the Graphic Canadian Warning Labels on Adult Smoking Behaviour, 12 
TOBACCO CONTROL 391, 393 (2003). 
84.  New Zealand: Tobacco Labelling Regulations, TOBACCO LABELING RESOURCE 
CTR., http://www. tobaccolabels.ca/countries/new-zealand/ [https://perma.cc/4VWP-
EHNY] (last visited Apr. 17, 2017). 
85.  European Union: Tobacco Labelling Regulations, TOBACCO LABELING 
RESOURCE CTR., http://www.tobaccolabels.ca/countries/european-union/ [https://per-
macc/BCV2-75BE] (last visited Apr. 17, 2017).  
86.  Hoek et al., supra note 74, at 610. 
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example, an Illinois statute prohibiting smoking in public places, 
places of employment, and government-owned vehicles imposes a 
fine of “$100 for a first offense and $250 for each subsequent  
offense” on individuals who smoke in prohibited areas.87   
Smoke-free laws may also regulate third parties by mandating 
that they adopt policies prohibiting smoking.  For example, the 
same Illinois statute obligates individuals and corporations that 
own, operate, or otherwise control a public place or place of  
employment to post no smoking signs, remove ashtrays,88 and 
“reasonably assure that smoking is prohibited,”89 subject to a fine 
of “$250 for the first violation, . . . $500 for the second violation 
within one year . . . , and $2,500 for each additional violation 
within one year . . . .”90 
Within the last several years, a few local governments have 
pioneered the adoption of ordinances prohibiting smoking in 
multi-unit housing facilities.91  Many ordinances apply only to 
publicly subsidized housing, while others apply to non-subsidized 
units as well.92  Smoke-free housing laws reduce the exposure of 
nonsmokers to secondhand smoke in their homes because it is not 
possible to block smoke from traveling through ventilation  
systems and other conduits.93  Tobacco residue can be found on 
the floors and surfaces of nonsmokers’ homes due to smoking in 
neighboring units, posing a hazard to young children.94 
Like recent efforts to prohibit smoking in multi-unit housing 
facilities, early prohibitions on smoking in enclosed spaces such 
as restaurants, bars, and workplaces were justified primarily in 
terms of harm to others from secondhand smoke.  It soon became 
clear, however, that these laws “reduce smoking because [they] 
undercut the social support network for smoking by implicitly  
 
87.  410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 82/45(b) (2016). 
88.  410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 82/15; 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 82/45(b). 
89.  410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 82/20(b-c). 
90.  410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 82/45(b). 
91.  Diller, supra note 67, at 1230. 
92.  Mireya Navarro, U.S. Will Ban Smoking in Public Housing Nationwide, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/30/nyregion/us-will-ban-
smoking-in-public-housing-nationwide.html?_r=0 https://perma.cc/M6NA-9YSF]. 
93.  Nat’l Ctr. for Healthy Housing, Reasons to Explore Smoke-Free Housing, 
http://www.nchh.org/portals/0/contents/nchh_green_factsheet_smokefree.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G8HN-JE73] (last visited April 17, 2017); Karen M. Wilson et al., 
Tobacco-Smoke Exposure in Children Who Live in Multiunit Housing, 127 PEDIATRICS 
85, i, viii-ix, 86 (2011). 
94.  See U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., Regulatory Impact Analysis,  
Instituting Smoke-Free Public Housing 7-8 (Dec. 5, 2016). 
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defining smoking as an antisocial act.”95  The denormalization 
purpose of smoke-free laws has become increasingly explicit as 
several jurisdictions have extended smoke-free rules to outdoor 
areas where secondhand smoke poses little risk.96  “[E]fforts to 
extend smoking bans to beaches and parks [appear to be] policy 
initiatives designed to denormalize smoking[,] having as their  
ultimate goal a profound transformation in public norms and  
behavior.”97  Some jurisdictions have expanded their smoke-free 
laws to include e-cigarettes because of concerns that the rapid  
increase in e-cigarette use could renormalize smoking behavior.98 
Smoke-free laws are aimed at altering the behavior of current 
smokers while also altering the social environment in which  
consumers make choices about whether to initiate or continue  
tobacco use.99  Bans on smoking in workplaces, restaurants, bars, 
and other spaces make it less convenient to smoke, while also  
“reducing smoking visibility in these settings and encouraging  
societal disapproval of smoking.”100  Smoke-free housing laws, 
particularly if they are applied to subsidized low-income housing, 
leave residents with few alternatives to quitting.  They may also 
create a more supportive environment for those who are trying to 
quit.101  “More than most other tobacco control measures, smoke-
free legislation can denormalize tobacco use by transforming 
smoking norms and accelerating approval of a nonsmoking  
 
95.  RONALD BAYER & ERIC FELDMAN, UNFILTERED: CONFLICTS OVER TOBACCO 
POLICY AND PUBLIC HEALTH 24 (2004) (quoting Samuel Glantz); see also Burris (2002), 
supra note 18, at 187 (“From being a glamorous activity, smoking has been  
transformed into antisocial self-destruction. Law, it is said, has played a role in this 
by, for example, forcing smokers who wish to light up in public to congregate in special 
and often undesirable areas, such as outside the doors of smoke-free facilities or in 
sepulchral basement smoking rooms.”). 
96.  Ronald Bayer & Kathleen E. Bachynski, Banning Smoking in Parks and on 
Beaches: Science, Policy, and the Politics of Denormalization, 32 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1291 
(2013). 
97.  Id. at 1291. 
98.  See Parmet, supra note 55. 
99.  Tan CE et al., Association Between Smoke-free Legislation and  
Hospitalizations for Cardiac, Cerebrovascular, and Respiratory Diseases: A Meta- 
Analysis, 126 CIRCULATION 2177 (Oct. 30, 2012); Cheng KW et al., Association Between 
Smokefree Laws and Voluntary Smokefree-Home Rules, 41 AM. J. PREV. MED. 566 
(2011).  
100. Abraham Brown et al., A Longitudinal Study of Policy Effect (Smoke-free 
Legislation) on Smoking Norms: ITC Scotland/United Kingdom, 11 NICOTINE & 
TOBACCO RES. 924, 925 (2009). 
101. Maya Vijayaraghavan, The Effectiveness of Cigarette Price and Smoke-Free 
Homes on Low-Income Smokers in the United States, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2276 
(2013); A. Hyland et al., Smoke-Free Homes and Smoking Cessation and Relapse in a 
Longitudinal Population of Adults, 11 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. 614 (2009).  
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environment as the prevailing norm.”102 
G. Discrimination Against Tobacco Users 
Some interventions target tobacco users indirectly by  
permitting or even encouraging private parties to discriminate 
against tobacco users.  Employers, health insurers, landlords, and 
condominium associations all have economic incentives to  
discriminate against tobacco users. Insurers pay for much of the 
health care tobacco users need.  Market forces and regulations 
limit their ability to pass those costs along to users. In addition to 
bearing significant health care costs, employers may also be  
affected by lost productivity due to tobacco users who experience 
more frequent illness.  Landlords have legitimate concerns about 
property damage to units occupied by smokers.  In each of these 
cases, private parties may be seeking to deter tobacco users from 
applying for jobs, insurance, or housing, to encourage current  
employees, insureds, or residents to quit, or a combination of the 
two.  Considering that the vast majority of the population does not 
smoke, landlords, condominium associations, and employers may 
try to attract nonsmokers by barring smokers.103  Some employers 
announce their intention to discriminate against tobacco users 
quite publicly,104 suggesting that a stance against tobacco use is 
part of the image they wish to present to the public.105 
Even employers who are willing to hire tobacco users  
routinely discriminate against them with respect to the terms of 
health insurance coverage.  The Affordable Care Act’s (ACA)  
restrictions on discrimination based on health status-related  
 
102. Brown, supra note 100, at 923. 
103. Bayer & Stuber, supra note 21, at 47 (“Firms boldly announce that they will 
not employ and may even fire smokers, because of the additional cost of their medical 
care, or because smoking does not project the ‘image’ they want to project to the  
public.”). 
104. Christopher Valleau, If You’re Smoking You’re Fired: How Tobacco Could Be 
Dangerous to More Than Just Your Health, 10 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 457, 462 
(2007) (describing high profile announcements by employers). 
105. Bayer & Stuber, supra note 21.  See also Elizabeth Rader et al., No Smokers 
Allowed, 30 ACC DOCKET 80 (April 10, 2012) (quoting an announcement by the  
Cleveland Clinic that it will not hire smokers: “As a true ‘health care’ provider, we must 
create a culture of wellness that permeates the entire institution, from the care we  
provide, to our physical environment, to the food we offer, and yes, even to our  
employees. If we are to be advocates of healthy living and disease prevention, we need 
to be role models for our patients, our communities and each other. In other words, if 
we are to ‘talk the talk’ we need to ‘walk the walk.’”). 
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factors, which inspired Roberts’s first foray into healthism,106  
explicitly permit discrimination based on tobacco use.107  In the 
employer-based insurance market, insurers have long been  
required to set premiums at the population level rather than  
discriminating based on an individual employee’s (and  
dependents’) risk profile.108  Insurers are permitted, however, to 
impose penalties on individual employees for tobacco use through 
a wellness program, an exception that is codified within the 
ACA.109 
Health insurers operating independently of employers also 
discriminate against tobacco users.  The ACA permits insurers in 
the small-group and non-group markets to vary premiums for  
individual versus family coverage and based on geographic area, 
age, and tobacco use—while prohibiting rate setting based on any 
other consideration.110  Through either mechanism—the premium 
surcharge in the direct-purchase market or wellness program 
penalties in the group market—insurers may charge tobacco  
users up to 50% more than nonusers.111 
III. FRAMEWORKS FOR ASSESSING TOBACCO 
DENORMALIZATION 
In applying their anti-healthism principle to policies that  
discriminate on the basis of tobacco use, Roberts and Leonard  
enter an ongoing debate over the legal and ethical permissibility 
of tobacco control.  In this part, I introduce four alternative  
frameworks for assessing tobacco denormalization.  I begin by  
describing the legal protections that apply to tobacco control  
generally and denormalization in particular.  Then I describe 
 
106. Roberts (2012), supra note 23.  
107. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2012). 
108. Roberts (2012), supra note 23, at 1178-82 (discussing limits discrimination 
imposed on group health plans by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act). 
109. See Lindsay F. Wiley, Access to Health Care as an Incentive for Healthy  
Behavior? An Assessment of the Affordable Care Act’s Personal Responsibility for  
Wellness Provisions, 11 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 642 (2014) (discussing the history of  
wellness program regulation under HIPAA and the ACA) [hereinafter Wiley Access to 
Health Care].  
110. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a) (2012). 
111. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a)(1)(A)(iv) (2012) (providing that rates may not vary 
based on tobacco use by more than a ratio of 1.5 to 1); Wiley Access to Health Care, 
supra note 109, at 680 n.146 (discussing the HHS Secretary’s decision to raise the 
threshold for wellness program rewards to 50% for tobacco cessation, but not for other 
programs). 
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health justice, the libertarian principle of anti-healthism, and 
Roberts and Leonard’s alternative anti-healthism principle. 
A. Legal Protections 
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of constitutional  
protections for liberty and autonomy allow the government wide 
latitude to discourage tobacco consumption.  Of course, “[t]he  
Constitution does not explicitly mention smoking” or tobacco.112  
“Therefore, if there were a constitutional right to smoke” or use or 
sell tobacco products, “it would have to fall under the umbrella of 
one of the recognized constitutional rights.”113  One argument is 
that the liberty to sell and use tobacco products is protected by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.114  
Another argument is that the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment (applied to the federal government via 
incorporation into the Fifth) protects tobacco users and sellers 
from unjustified discrimination.115  Finally, the First  
Amendment’s guarantee of free expression has implications for 
communication about tobacco use, including government- 
sponsored countermarketing, advertising restrictions, and  
warning mandates.116  Essentially, while the government’s  
legitimate interest in protecting the health and safety of the  
people (even from their own choices and actions) is well  
established,117 in cases where a fundamental right or suspect  
classification is implicated, a purely paternalistic government  
interest may not be sufficiently compelling to justify  
infringement.118 
 
112. Samantha K. Graff, There is No Constitutional Right to Smoke, TOBACCO 
CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM 2 (2008), http://www.smokefreehousingny.org/wp- 
content/uploads/No-constitutional-right.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HTL-TEVG]. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 36, at 449-57. 
117. See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001) (upholding 
the constitutionality of an arrest and the jailing of a woman for failure to wear a  
seatbelt); Simon v. Sargent, 346 F. Supp. 277, 278-79 (D. Mass. 1972) (per curiam) 
(holding that a statute requiring motorcyclists to wear protective headgear does not 
violate due process, notwithstanding the claim that “police power does not extend to 
overcoming the right of an individual to incur risks that involve only himself”), aff’d 
without opinion, 409 U.S. 1020 (1972).  
118. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 507 n.12 (1996) 
(striking down a regulation prohibiting advertisement of alcohol prices on First 
Amendment grounds, in part because “[i]t is perfectly obvious that alternative forms 
of regulation that would not involve any restriction on speech would be more likely to 
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Tobacco users and sellers have found little success under the 
Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments.  Although the Due Process 
Clause has been interpreted as protecting a fundamental right to 
privacy, including decisional privacy,119 the Supreme Court has 
not extended constitutional privacy doctrine to encompass a right 
to buy, sell, or use any particular product or service in any  
particular configuration.120  Longstanding Supreme Court  
precedents interpreting the Equal Protection Clause apply  
minimal judicial scrutiny to government actions that draw  
classifications that are not constitutionally suspect.121  Actions 
that distinguish between tobacco users and nonusers, between  
tobacco products and other products, between tobacco  
manufacturers and other manufacturers, or between tobacco  
retailers and other retailers satisfy the Constitution’s guarantee 
 
achieve the State’s goal of promoting temperance” including taxation, direct regulation 
establishing minimum prices or maximum per capita purchases, or education); Va. 
State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) 
(striking down a “highly paternalistic” regulation prohibiting pharmacists from  
advertising the prices of prescription drugs, but noting that the state “is free to require 
whatever professional standards it wishes of its pharmacists”); Frontiero v.  
Richardson, 411 U.S. 477, 484 (1973) (rejecting sex discrimination “rationalized by an 
attitude of ‘romantic paternalism’ which, in practical effect, put women, not on a  
pedestal, but in a cage”).  
119. GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 36, at 135-36. 
120. See, e.g., Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Dev. Drugs v. Von  
Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 697, 703-07 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1159 
(2008) (holding that terminally ill adult patients do not have a fundamental right of 
access to investigational drugs, after surveying the long history of drug regulation); 
Lange-Kessler v. Dep’t of Educ. of N.Y., 109 F.3d 137, 139 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that 
the right to privacy does not encompass a woman’s right to choose a direct-entry  
midwife to assist during childbirth); see also Samuel R. Wiseman, Liberty of Palate, 65 
ME. L. REV. 737, 744 (2013) (concluding that there is no constitutionally protected 
right to consume the foods of one’s choosing, based on “the long history of curtailment 
of food choice, and the lack of any constitutional protection or tradition of broadly  
protecting food rights”).  “[T]he Court declared decades ago its ‘abandonment of the 
use of the ‘vague contours’ of the Due Process Clause to nullify laws which a majority 
of the Court believed to be economically unwise.’”  In re Late Fee and Over-Limit Fee 
Litig. v. Bank of America, 741 F.3d 1022, 1029 (9th Cir. 2014) (Reinhardt, J.,  
concurring) (quoting Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963) and citing Lochner 
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND OF JUDICIAL REVIEW DISTRUST: A THEORY 14 (1980) (Lochner and 
similar cases are “now universally acknowledged to have been constitutionally  
improper”); see Michael J. Phillips, Another Look at Economic Substantive Due Process, 
1987 WIS. L. REV. 265 (reviewing the historical development and demise of enhanced 
constitutional protection of economic liberties under the substantive due process  
doctrine, assessing proposals to revive it, and ultimately concluding that such a revival 
would be inadvisable). 
121. Suspect classifications include race, color, national origin, and religion.  
GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 36, at 137-38. 
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of equal protection unless they lack a rational relationship to a 
legitimate state purpose—a very low bar.  Discouraging tobacco 
use is widely accepted as a legitimate government purpose.122   
Under the rational basis test applicable to most tobacco control 
measures, judges are generally reluctant to second-guess  
lawmakers’ judgment regarding the best means for serving that 
purpose.123 
The First Amendment provides the only significant  
constitutional limit on governmental tobacco control.  Beginning 
in the 1960s, the Supreme Court extended limited First  
Amendment protection to commercial advertisers.124  Under an 
intermediate review standard articulated by the Court in 1980, 
the government bears the burden of showing that restrictions on 
commercial speech directly advance a substantial government  
interest and are no more extensive than necessary to serve that 
interest.125  Reducing tobacco use is widely viewed as a  
substantial interest,126 but courts have invalidated some  
restrictions on tobacco advertising based on a judicial  
determination that lawmakers’ chosen means do not directly  
advance that interest or are more extensive than necessary.127  
Tobacco companies and others continue to litigate the open  
question of whether the same standard applies to compelled 
speech, including mandated warnings.  The Supreme Court has 
differentiated between mandates that “prescribe what shall be  
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of 
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith 
therein” and those that “prescribe what shall be orthodox in  
 
122. See GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 36, at 456. 
123. Id. at 147-48.  
124. Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
773 (1976).  
125. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 477 U.S. 557, 
566 (1980).  
126. But see R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 
1205, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (assuming that the FDA has a substantial interest in  
reducing smoking rates, while cautioning in a footnote that “we are skeptical that the 
government can assert a substantial interest in discouraging consumers from  
purchasing a lawful product, even one that has been conclusively linked to adverse 
health consequences.  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has at least implied that the 
government could have a substantial interest in reducing smoking rates because  
smoking poses ‘perhaps the single most significant threat to public health in the 
United States.’” (quoting U.S. Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000)), rev’d on other grounds, Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t. 
of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).  
127. GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 36, at 455 (discussing Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. 
Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001)). 
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commercial advertising.”128  The Court has applied the more  
lenient rational basis test to evaluate mandates to disclose 
“purely factual and uncontroversial information” about a product 
or service,129 but the scope of this carve-out is unclear.130 
Although these cases concern the liberty enjoyed by tobacco 
sellers rather than consumers, decisions striking down  
advertising restrictions often rely on a pro-consumer rationale.131  
The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that protecting  
commercial enterprises’ freedom of expression serves the public’s 
interest in receiving information about lawful consumer  
products.132  But the notion that constitutional protection for  
commercial speech is justified by consumer freedom only goes so 
far.  Ironically, courts have struck down advertising regulations 
precisely because the government has the option of reducing  
tobacco use through other means (e.g., banning tobacco products 
or mandating a minimum price) that are less restrictive of sellers’ 
speech, even though many would view them as far more  
restrictive of consumers’ freedom.133 
Moving from constitutional to statutory limits on tobacco  
control, state and local governments have broad police power to 
adopt antidiscrimination protections that extend beyond the  
Supreme Court’s Equal Protection Doctrine.  As discussed in more 
detail below, about half of states prohibit employment  
discrimination based on off-the-job tobacco use134 and several 
 
128. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 
U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of 
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).  
129. Id. 
130. See infra Part III.D. 
131. GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 36, at 143 (discussing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 
U.S. 809 (1975) and Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
435 U.S. 748 (1976)); Alan B. Morrison, How We Got the Commercial Speech Doctrine: 
An Originalist’s Recollections, 54 CASE WESTERN RESERVE L. REV. 1189 (2004). 
132. GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 36, at 456. 
133. Id. (discussing 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 476 (1995). 
134. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-9-195(a)(4) (West 1957) (providing that it is 
a discriminatory or unfair employment practice “[f]or an employer to require as a  
condition of employment that any employee or prospective employee use or refrain 
from using tobacco products outside the course of his employment, or otherwise to  
discriminate against any person in matters of compensation or the terms, conditions 
or privileges of employment on the basis of use or nonuse of tobacco products outside 
the course of his employment unless it is a bona fide occupational qualification that a 
person not use tobacco products outside the workplace.  Nothing within this paragraph 
shall prohibit an employer from offering, imposing or having in effect a health,  
disability or life insurance policy distinguishing between employees for type or price 
of coverage based upon the use or nonuse of tobacco products if: (A) Differential rates 
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states have broader statutes barring employment discrimination 
based on any lawful, off-the-job activity or consumption of lawful 
products.135  The tobacco industry has joined civil liberties  
advocates to promote protections for smokers.136  These laws are 
in tension with federal rules that permit employers to penalize 
tobacco users by imposing higher health insurance premiums or 
less favorable cost-sharing terms on them via an employee health 
plan.  Congress has expressly saved state and local  
antidiscrimination laws from preemption, however, noting that 
wellness programs must comply with applicable federal and state 
antidiscrimination laws. 
The federal government has also used its power to regulate 
interstate commerce to restrict disability discrimination by  
employers, public programs, and public accommodations.  Courts 
have held that the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) does not 
afford protection to nicotine addicts.137  These precedents predate 
2008 amendments to the ADA that significantly broadened its 
definition of disability, however, and the current status of nicotine 
addiction as a protected disability is unclear.138  As noted above, 
the Affordable Care Act explicitly permitted discrimination 
against tobacco users, even as it restricted discrimination based 
on other health status-related factors. 
Public health law scholar Scott Burris (whose work on the 
ethics of shame-based public health interventions is discussed in 
Part II.C below) has argued that public health advocates should 
be mindful of the limitations of law as a tool for protecting people 
from health-based stigma: “Much, perhaps most, enacted stigma 
 
assessed employees reflect an actual differential cost to the employer; and (B)  
Employers provide written notice to employees setting forth the differential rates  
imposed by insurance carriers.”). 
135. See Stephen D. Sugarman, “Lifestyle” Discrimination in Employment, 24 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 377, 418 (2003) (“‘Smokers’ rights’ laws swept through 
more than two dozen legislatures in the early 1990s as a result of the combined  
lobbying of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the tobacco industry.  
These laws were provoked primarily by reports that a significant number of firms  
already refused to hire smokers and a fear that the trend was growing.  At the urging 
of the ACLU and others, once smokers’ rights proposals got into the legislative process, 
they were broadened in some jurisdictions . . . to cover alcohol, to cover all legal  
products, to cover other specific behavior, as in New York, and to cover all off-work 
behavior, as in North Dakota and Colorado.”). 
136. Id. 
137. See e.g., Brashear v. Simms, 138 F. Supp. 2d 693, 695 (D. Md. 2001). 
138. Matthew M. Allen, Everybody’s Vaping for the Weekend: Nicotine Addiction 
as a Workplace Disability, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1393, 1395 (2016) (arguing that the 2008 
amendments and recent case law “can be interpreted to protect nicotine addicts who 
consume electronic cigarettes during smoking cessation attempts”). 
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will not take the form of the sort of overt and demonstrably  
intentional discrimination prohibited by law.”139  For this reason, 
Burris and others turn to extralegal frameworks to assess  
potential interventions, rather than ending their inquiry by  
determining that discriminatory or shame-based interventions 
are legally permissible.  In turn, these extralegal frameworks may 
guide lawmakers as they assess potential reforms and judges and 
regulatory agencies as they interpret existing laws. 
B. Libertarian Anti-Healthism 
Notwithstanding the lack of constitutional protections for  
tobacco users’ and sellers’ liberty interests, critics of tobacco  
control have long argued as a political and ethical matter that 
anti-tobacco regulations go too far in hampering autonomy.  Some 
libertarian critics, most famously Robert Crawford140 and Petr 
Skrabanek, have used the term healthism to describe “the  
ideology of the ‘health of the nation,’” which they warn poses a 
danger “to our right to do as we like with our lives, to our  
autonomy to pursue our kind of happiness, to the liberty of the 
Savage in the Brave New World.”141  Skrabanek, himself a 
smoker,142 traced the rise of healthism as a “state ideology” to  
 
139. Burris (2002), supra note 18, at 182. 
140. Robert Crawford, Healthism and the Medicalization of Everyday Life, 10 
INT’L J. HEALTH SERVICES 365, 368 (1980) (defining healthism “as the preoccupation 
with personal health as a primary—often the primary—focus for the definition and 
achievement of well-being; a goal which is to be attained primarily through the  
modification of life styles, with or without therapeutic help.”); Robert Crawford, Health 
as a Meaningful Social Practice, 10 HEALTH 401 (2006); see also SHARI L. DWORKIN & 
LINDA FAYE WATTS, BODY PANIC: GENDER, HEALTH, AND THE SELLING OF FITNESS 11-
12 (2009) (crediting Crawford with coining the term healthism). 
141. Skrabanek (1994), supra note 28, at 11; see also DANIEL CALLAHAN, 
PROMOTING HEALTHY BEHAVIOR: HOW MUCH FREEDOM? HOW MUCH RESPONSIBILITY? 
141-142 (2000) (discussing the tyranny of “healthism”); Stacy Carter et al., Shared 
Health Governance: The Potential Danger of Oppressive “Healthism”, 11 AM. J. 
BIOETHICS 57, 68 (2011) (characterizing “oppressive healthism” as “impairing people’s 
opportunities to be who they want to be by enforcing health practices that may not be 
valued by all—or even by most.”); Andrea Freeman, The Unbearable Whiteness of Milk: 
Food Oppression and the USDA, 3 UC IRVINE L. REV. 1251, 1270 (2013) 
(“Healthism promotes the ideals of thinness and fitness and perceives individuals who 
fail to adhere to or achieve these ideals to be imposing unfair costs on others.”); See 
e.g. KATE FITZPATRICK & RICHARD TINNING, EDS., HEALTH EDUCATION: CRITICAL 
PERSPECTIVES (2014) (collecting several essays reflecting on Crawford’s concept of 
healthism). 
142. Skrabanek (1994), supra note 28, at 9.  After his death at age 53 from  
prostate cancer, Skrabanek was accused of accepting support from the tobacco  
industry.  See Clare Dyer, Tobacco Company Set Up Network of Sympathetic Scientists, 
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efforts in the United States in the 1970s to attack the “moralists’ 
trinity of evils—drink, tobacco, and sex.”143  It was then, he  
argued, that the government first adopted a strategy that “goes 
beyond education and information on matters of health and uses 
propaganda and various forms of coercion to establish norms of a 
‘healthy lifestyle’ for all.”144 
Skrabanek was not a legal scholar, but his position would 
support a broader reading of the Due Process Clause to protect 
the liberty to buy and use products and services despite the  
government’s determination that they are harmful.  His position 
might also support broader First Amendment constraints on  
mandated commercial speech by rejecting the Supreme Court’s 
current distinction between government efforts to prescribe  
orthodox ideology (which are strictly scrutinized by judges) and 
those that aim merely to prescribe what is orthodox in matters of 
commercial advertising. 
Skrabanek frequently articulated his position in terms of  
debates over the legitimate scope of medical practice and public 
health.  He criticized the rise of what he called “anticipatory  
medicine,” which, he explained, “is not the same as traditional 
preventive medicine which was limited mainly to vaccination 
against specific diseases, and the reduction of the spread of  
infection by maintaining a clean water supply, abattoir  
inspection, control of the food chain, etc.”  He connected this  
phenomenon to the rise of a new model of public health: 
 
 
 
316 BMJ 1553 (1998).  The Lancet, also implicated in the scandal, clarified that the 
accusations were unsubstantiated and that there was no evidence that Skrabanek’s 
writings published in the Lancet were influenced by any relationship he may have had 
with the tobacco industry.  James McCormich & Robin Fox, Death of Petr Skrabanek, 
344 LANCET 52 (1994).  In response to the scandal, the Lancet Ombudsman  
recommended that, going forward, the journal should require all authors to declare 
financial relationships with industry.  See Thomas Sherwood, Ombudsman’s Second 
Report, and Tobacco, 352 LANCET 7 (1998).  Richard Epstein, a legal scholar who has 
articulated libertarian views in his work on tobacco control, has disclosed ties to the 
tobacco industry.  See Richard A. Epstein, Subrogation, and Insurance, with Special 
Reference to the Tobacco Litigation,  41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 493, 493 (1997) (“[F]irst a 
disclaimer. I have worked with Philip Morris on a variety of tobacco cases for a long 
period of time.”) [hereinafter Epstein (1997)]. 
143. Skrabanek (1994), supra note 28, at 11-12; see also Crawford Healthism and 
the Medicalization of Everyday Life, supra note 140 (linking healthism to “social  
effort[s] to gain control over that part of the human experience captured by the concept 
of health . . . made in the late 1970s in the United States.”). 
144. Skrabanek (1994), supra note 28, at 15. 
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While the old public health was based on discoveries 
made by natural sciences and on technology and  
engineering, the new public health, while retaining 
the title, has little to do with science. . . . It accepts 
evidence not according to its quality but according to 
its conformity with a foregone conclusion. Nearly all 
its evidence is based on convoluted statistical  
arguments.145 
 
In his characteristically stark, memorable prose, Skrabanek 
cautioned: “The roads to unfreedom are many. Signposts on one 
of them bear the inscription HEALTH FOR ALL.”146 
Legal scholars have also sought to defend the old public 
health against the new.147  Richard Epstein,148 Mark Hall,149 and 
Mark Rothstein150 have expressed concerns about the expansion 
of public health law to encompass noncommunicable disease,  
injury prevention, and the social determinants of health.151   
Epstein in particular has argued vehemently against categorizing 
 
145. Skrabanak (1994), supra note 28, at 28.  See also P. Skrabanek, Smoking 
and Statistical Overkill, 340 THE LANCET 1208 (1992) [hereinafter Skrabanek (1992)] 
(“In clinical medicine, strict standards apply for evaluation of therapies, and anything 
short of randomized double blind trials is frowned upon as unreliable evidence.  By 
contrast, risk-factor epidemiology relies on case-control or cohort studies, without  
rigorous standards of design, execution, and interpretation, even though such studies 
are susceptible to at least fifty-six different biases . . . .  In politically sensitive areas—
for example, the alleged harm of passive smoking—poor data are manipulated to reach 
a foregone conclusion.”). 
146. Skrabanak (1994), supra note 28, at 11.  
147. See generally Lindsay F. Wiley, Rethinking the New Public Health, 69 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 207 (2012) (characterizing and responding to critics of an expanded 
scope of public health law) [hereinafter Wiley New Public Health]. 
148. Richard A. Epstein, Let the Shoemaker Stick to His Last: In Defense of the 
“Old” Public Health, 46 PERSP. IN BIOLOGY & MED. S138 (2003)  
(hereinafter Epstein (2003)]; Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the “Old” Public Health, 
69 BROOK. L. REV. 1421 (2004) [hereinafter Epstein (2004)]; Richard A. Epstein, What 
(Not) to Do About Obesity: A Moderate Aristotelian Answer, 93 GEO. L. J. 1361 (2005) 
[hereinafter Epstein (2005)].  
149. Mark A. Hall, The Scope and Limits of Public Health Law, 64 PERSP. IN 
BIOLOGY & MED. S199, S199, S207 (2003). 
150. Mark A. Rothstein, Rethinking the Meaning of Public Health, 30 J. L. MED. 
& ETHICS 144 (2002); Mark A. Rothstein, The Limits of Public Health: A Response, 2 
PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 84 (2009). 
151. See, e.g., LISA F. BERKMAN & ICHIRO KAWACHI, SOCIAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 352-
54 (2000); JULIE G. CWIKEL, SOCIAL EPIDEMIOLOGY: STRATEGIES FOR PUBLIC HEALTH 
ACTIVISM 371 (2006).  For a critical discussion of the emergence of social epidemiology 
as a distinct field, see Gerhard A. Zielhuis & Lambertus A.L.M. Kiemeney, Social  
Epidemiology? No Way, 30 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 43 (2001). 
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so-called lifestyle diseases related to diet, physical inactivity, and 
tobacco use as “public health” problems because “the case for  
government intervention . . . gets that extra boost of legitimacy” 
when framed as a public health issue.152 
Epstein and like-minded legal scholars base their libertarian 
critique largely on economic theory.”  These scholars view people 
as rational actors who carefully weigh costs and benefits and 
make choices that maximize their own utility (or well-being).  If 
this view is correct, paternalism in general, and psychic taxes in 
particular, should play no role in government policy.”153  Some, 
such as Epstein, attack the very premise that tobacco use and 
other risk factors for noncommunicable disease are legitimate 
public problems, as opposed to personal ones:154 
 
[S]ome measure of blame for poor health and wealth 
outcomes should fall on the individuals, and their 
parents, who have failed to make any . . . efforts at 
self-improvement and self-preservation.  Most  
modern public health issues have nothing to do with 
communicable diseases.  The current killers are 
drug abuse, obesity, diabetes, heart disease, high 
blood pressure, tobacco and alcohol, all of which are 
best controlled by individual decisions that don’t  
depend on state intervention to control or cure. . . . 
[The egalitarian] literature seems to suffer from an 
undercurrent of making excuses for bad conduct, 
which only aggravates the basic problem.  Of course, 
no one should treat all these harms as though they 
were self-inflicted.  But we should expect some  
serious examination of the tough trade-off between 
extra assistance after the fact and the increased risk 
of poor behaviors before the fact.155 
 
Others, such as Gary Lucas, point out that even if public 
health advocates are content to have the government discourage 
tobacco use, they should nonetheless be concerned about a  
“slippery slope, leading to the adoption of laws that many people 
 
152. Epstein (2004), supra note 148, at 1424.  
153. Lucas, supra note 82, at 230. 
154. Epstein (2005), supra note 149, at 1368-69. 
155. Richard A. Epstein, Decentralized Responses to Good Fortune and Bad Luck, 
9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 309, 338 (2009). 
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will find objectionable or even abusive.”156  Lucas points to state 
laws mandating misleading statements by doctors about  
purported risks of abortion.  “Abortion-rights advocates will likely 
find it easier to oppose this practice if the public generally 
views psychic taxes with suspicion than if psychic taxes are an 
established instrument for manipulating behavior.”157  Lucas’s 
point, perhaps unintentionally, turns the central insight of the 
denormalization strategy against its proponents: take care lest 
government denormalization become normalized. 
C. Health Justice 
The question at the heart of libertarian critiques of new  
public health’s expanded focus on noncommunicable disease and 
injury—what, if any, actions should the state adopt to encourage 
healthier lifestyles—also animates the work of many public 
health ethicists and legal scholars, including myself.  Indeed, the 
recent emergence of public health ethics as a discipline distinct 
from bioethics and the ongoing public health law renaissance can 
be traced, in part, to the issues raised by the new public health.158  
Whereas bioethics and health care law are principally concerned 
with the relationship between the patient and the health care  
system with an eye toward securing patient autonomy, public 
health law and ethics focus on the relationship between the  
individual and the state with an eye toward balancing individual 
autonomy with the common good.  Public health ethicist Dan 
Beauchamp began his seminal 1985 article with questions much 
like those that drove Skrabanek’s inquiry a decade later: “Can 
there be good reasons for public health paternalism in a  
democracy?  Are health and safety individual interests, or also 
common and shared ends?”159  Needless to say, ethicists and legal 
scholars who identify themselves as working within the public 
health tradition—myself included—typically adopt a perspective 
that is at odds with libertarian antipaternalism.  We are deeply 
 
156. Lucas, supra note 82, at 231-32. 
157. Id. at 231-32. 
158. Wiley New Public Health, supra note 148, at 224 (describing the emergence 
of the behavioral and social-ecological models of public health and associated  
controversy over the legitimate scope of public health law); Lindsay F. Wiley, From 
Patient Rights to Health Justice: Securing the Public’s Interest in Affordable, High-
Quality Health Care, 37 CARDOZO L. REV 833, 864-65 (2016) (describing the emergence 
of public health ethics as distinct from bioethics) [hereinafter Wiley Patient Rights]. 
159. Dan E. Beauchamp, Community: The Neglected Tradition of Public Health, 
15 THE HASTINGS CTR. REP. 28 (1985). 
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concerned with individual liberty, but we seek to balance it with 
collective interests in the context of a broader focus on social  
justice.  Nancy Kass describes public health ethics as aiming to 
“advance traditional public health goals [of improving the health 
of populations rather than of individuals] while maximizing  
individual liberties and furthering social justice.”160  Public health 
ethicists propose, for example, that data must substantiate that a 
[public health intervention] will reduce morbidity or mortality; 
burdens of the program must be identified and minimized; the 
program must be implemented fairly and must, at times,  
minimize preexisting social injustices; and fair procedures must 
be used to determine which burdens are acceptable to a  
community.161 
Similarly, Lawrence Gostin and I have advocated for a  
systematic evaluation of public health regulation that draws on 
public health science and ethics to assess (1) regulatory  
justifications, (2) risks to health and safety, (3) the effectiveness 
of interventions, (4) economic costs, (5) personal burdens, (6)  
distribution of benefits and burdens, and (7) the transparency and 
legitimacy of the regulatory process.162 
Gostin and I expressly advocate for health justice.163  Most 
relevant for the purposes of this article, the health justice model 
emphasizes the need for more probing inquiry into the effects of 
class, racial, and other forms of social and cultural bias on the 
design and implementation of measures to reduce health  
disparities.164  It also counsels prioritization of facilitating social-
ecological interventions (e.g., ensuring sufficient access to health 
 
160. Nancy E.  Kass, An Ethics Framework for Public Health, 91 AM. J. PUBLIC 
HEALTH 1776, 1776 (2001).  To be fair, Skrabanek raised concerns about social justice 
as well as autonomy.  “Extreme versions of healthism,” he noted, “provide a  
justification for racism, segregation, and eugenic control.”  He believed, however, that 
this extreme situation was not found in “Western democracies” where a weaker version 
of healthism prevails.  Skrabanek (1994), supra note 28, at 15. 
161. Kass, supra note 160, at 1776. 
162. GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 36, at 40.  The framework we describe, which 
first appeared in previous editions of the text authored by Gostin alone, owes much to 
the Human Rights Impact Assessment developed by Gostin and Jonathan Mann.  See 
Lawrence Gostin et al., Towards the Development of a Human Rights Impact  
Assessment for the Formulation and Evaluation of Public Health Policies, 1 HEALTH & 
HUM. RTS. 58, 59 (1994). 
163. Lindsay F. Wiley, Health Law as Social Justice, 24 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 47, 83 (2014) [Hereinafter Wiley Social Justice]; Wiley Patient Rights, supra 
note 158, at 888; GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 36, at 531–50; Lindsay F. Wiley,  
Applying the Health Justice Framework to Diabetes as a Community-managed Social 
Phenomenon, 16 HOUSTON J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 101, 129 (2016).  
164. Wiley Social Justice, supra note 163, at 95-101. 
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care and public health services and other forms of social support) 
over individually-targeted, victim-blaming behavioral  
interventions (e.g., punishments and rewards that put the onus 
on individuals to make healthier choices without necessarily  
making it easier for them to do so).165 
To sum up the public health framework as I have described 
it thus far: first, public health ethics requires an assessment of 
the benefits and burdens of tobacco denormalization as a public 
health intervention.  Second, health justice requires attention to 
the effects of bias on the design and implementation of tobacco 
denormalization.  Third, health justice also demands  
prioritization of facilitating social-ecological interventions over  
individually-targeted behavioral interventions. 
The growing literature on stigma and health provides  
insights useful for applying many of the public health ethics and 
health justice principles summarized above.  Public health  
ethicists and legal scholars have questioned “the general  
propriety of governmental attempts to direct social values and 
lifestyles” even when these attempts are limited to government 
sponsored communications.166  They express alarm at government  
interventions that exploit “unfavorable public sentiment toward 
smoking . . . as an informal social control device that enforces  
behavioral conformity among smokers.”167  In part, these concerns 
arise out of the apparent tension between tobacco  
denormalization and the widely held view that stigmatization of 
those who are already vulnerable provides the context within 
which disease spreads, exacerbating morbidity and mortality by 
erecting barriers between caregivers and those who are sick, and 
by constraining those who would intervene to contain the spread 
of illness.  In this view, it is the responsibility of public health 
officials to counteract stigmatization if they are to fulfill the  
mission to protect the communal health.168 
Ethicists and legal scholars, including Scott Burris,169  
Jennifer Stuber,170 and Ronald Bayer,171 have built on the general 
 
165. Lindsay F. Wiley, Shame, Blame, and the Emerging Law of Obesity Control, 
47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 121, 184 (2013) [hereinafter Wiley Obesity]. 
166. Ruth R. Faden, Ethical Issues in Government Sponsored Public Health  
Campaigns, 14 HEALTH EDUC. Q. 27 (1987). 
167. Kim & Shanahan, supra note 8, at 349. 
168. Bayer & Stuber, supra note 21, at 47. 
169. Burris (2002), supra note 18, at 179; Burris (2006), supra note 18, at 529;  
Burris (2008), supra note 18.  
170. Bayer & Stuber, supra note 21, at 47. 
171. Id.; Bayer (2008) supra note 34, at 466.  
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principles of public health ethics and sociological analyses of 
stigma and health to assess whether tobacco denormalization is 
consistent with the destigmatization strategy adopted by many 
public health advocates with respect to HIV prevention.  
Elsewhere, I have articulated these factors as follows:  
shame-based public health intervention is inappropriate where 
there is (1) a power differential between the stigmatized and the 
“normal” that makes possible (2) labeling, stereotyping, and  
categorization of the stigmatized as separate from the normal; 
and (3) the experience of status loss and discrimination by the 
stigmatized group that is enduring and engulfs the entire  
identity.172  Finally, after the first three factors have been  
considered, a balancing of the negative impact of the purported 
stigmatization against the potential utility of shame-based  
sanctions, in terms of public health costs and benefits, may be  
appropriate.173 
Considering these factors, Stuber, Bayer, and Burris  
conclude that at least some forms of tobacco denormalization are 
acceptable, but their conclusions are contingent on social factors 
that are inherently dynamic.  Indeed, some tobacco control  
advocates have called for reevaluating denormalization in light of 
widening socioeconomic disparities between smokers and non-
smokers.  For example, in 2010, Kristen Bell et al., argued that 
“[s]tigmatizing smoking will not ultimately help to reduce  
smoking prevalence amongst disadvantaged smokers—who now 
represent the majority of tobacco users.  Rather, it is likely to  
exacerbate health-related inequalities by limiting smokers’ access 
to healthcare and inhibiting smoking cessation efforts in primary 
care settings.”174  It may also be the case that social disparities 
help explain why shame-based interventions are politically  
feasible.  Indeed, Bayer and Stuber have noted that states with 
aggressive antismoking campaigns began to “embrace [ ] a  
strategy of denormalization” only after “the social class  
composition of smokers underwent a dramatic shift downward.”175 
D. Egalitarian Anti-Healthism 
In her scholarship on the Affordable Care Act’s restrictions 
on health insurance underwriting and employment  
 
172. Wiley Obesity, supra note 165, at 139.  
173. Id. 
174. Bell, supra note 19, at 795.  
175. Bayer & Stuber, supra note 21, at 49. 
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discrimination, Roberts expressly repurposed the term healthism 
to describe “discrimination on the basis of health status.”176  
Working together, Roberts and Leonard add nuance, defining 
healthism as “systematic differential treatment of unhealthy  
individuals—individuals who have a sufficiently severe condition 
that they or society deem undesirable—in a way that inflicts a 
normative wrong.”177  The healthism decried by Crawford,  
Skrabanek, and others was an “ism” in the sense of communism 
or capitalism.  In contrast, Roberts and Leonard seek to establish 
healthism among “other familiar ‘isms,’ such as racism, sexism, 
ageism, and ableism.”178 
Roberts and Leonard articulate “a theoretical framework for 
understanding when differentiating on the basis of health is  
acceptable and when such differentiation should constitute  
legally restricted discrimination.”179  They articulate several  
factors in their efforts to “grapple with the normative-wrong and 
trait-versus-conduct elements of [their] healthism definition.”180  
Their framework is intended to provide a foundation for  
“extending the [anti-healthism] project [from Roberts’s initial  
focus on health insurance and employment] into a variety of other 
spheres, including health-care access, public health, reproductive 
technology, the marketplace, and the judicial system.”181   
Ultimately, their purpose is to “define a roadmap for  
policymaking that promotes health without unfairly  
discriminating.”182 
Even as they seek to extend their critique of healthism  
beyond employment discrimination and risk-based insurance  
underwriting, Roberts and Leonard continue to place theories of 
discrimination at the center of their framework.  They openly 
struggle, however, with the traditional focus of antidiscrimination 
 
176. Roberts (2012), supra note 23, at 1171.  Roberts described previous uses of 
the term as referring to “the shift in responsibility for health problems from the  
individual to the state” involving “the government’s promotion of coercive health 
norms, and its attempts to impose lifestyle choices deemed ‘healthy’ on its citizens.”  
Id.  This formulation does not quite capture Crawford’s core concern that health  
promotion activities in the 1970s reinforced a harmful notion of personal responsibility 
that blamed individuals for their own health problems.  It is more accurate as a  
reading of Skrabanek’s work, though I would describe his work as critiquing the shift 
in authority over health-related behaviors from the individual to the state.  
177. Roberts & Leonard, supra note 23, at 856. 
178. Id. at 838.  
179. Id. at 835. 
180. Id. at 856. 
181. Id. at 837. 
182. Id. at 862. 
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law on “distinctions between ‘mutable’ and ‘immutable’ traits” 
based on “[t]he rationale . . . that individuals should not be  
disadvantaged on the basis of traits that they did not choose, did 
not cause, and cannot change.” 183  They note that  
“antidiscrimination law has moved beyond immutability” with  
respect to characteristics like religion and sexual orientation on 
the grounds that “such characteristics are very difficult, as a  
practical matter, to change, or . . . are so fundamental to  
personhood that ‘it would be abhorrent for government to penalize 
a person for refusing to change them.’”184  Ultimately, they rely on 
expansion of antidiscrimination law beyond protection of  
immutable traits to “carve out a set of health-related statuses, 
traits, conditions, [and] conduct that should be protected from  
disadvantage, regardless of voluntariness.”185  They note that this 
is “a very difficult line to draw.”186  The challenge for Roberts and 
Leonard is that this “difficult line” is central to their project.  On 
one hand, their anti-healthism project depends on an  
antidiscrimination norm that condemns at least some forms of  
differentiation based on conduct and mutable traits.  On the other 
hand, the notion that “the law can appropriately incentivize  
individuals to alter their ‘bad’ conduct or choices and gain the 
privileges enjoyed by others who make ‘good’ choices”187 is the 
touchstone of their effort to save other forms of differentiation. 
Roberts and Leonard offer two rubrics for distinguishing  
between “‘good’ and ‘bad’ health-status differentiations.”188   
Unacceptable differentiation “[i]s driven by animus,”  
“[s]tigmatizes individuals unfairly, [p]unishes people for their  
private conduct, [ ] impedes access to health care, [c]uts off  
resources or otherwise limits the ability to adopt healthy life 
choices, [p]roduces worse health outcomes, or [m]aintains or  
increases existing disparities.”189  In a rough mirror image of the 
first rubric, acceptable differentiation is characterized by its  
tendency to “[p]romote healthy decisionmaking, [f]acilitate  
individual choices regarding health, [l]ower health risks, [l]ower 
health-care costs, and/or [f]acilitate better health care and better 
 
183. Roberts & Leonard, supra note 23, at 843. 
184. Id. at 844 (quoting Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(Norris, J. concurring)). 
185. Id. at 843. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. at 843. 
188. Id. at 896. 
189. Roberts & Leonard, supra note 23, at 895. 
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health-care access.”190  Together, the two rubrics emphasize the 
importance of discriminatory intent and impact, as well as  
consideration of health-related costs and benefits. 
IV. ASSESSING TOBACCO DENORMALIZATION 
The various tobacco denormalization interventions described 
in Part II offer fertile ground for examining the nuanced (and not-
so-nuanced) differences among the four frameworks introduced in 
Part III.  For each intervention, I will briefly discuss legal  
considerations before comparing and contrasting how the  
intervention might be viewed from the perspective of libertarian 
anti-healthism, health justice, and the Roberts and Leonard  
egalitarian anti-healthism principle.  All forms of tobacco  
denormalization are problematic from Skrabanek’s and Epstein’s 
libertarian anti-healthism perspective,191 but parsing what is 
most objectionable about any given strategy from this perspective 
is a worthwhile pursuit.  Health justice and the Roberts and  
Leonard anti-healthism principle provide more nuanced critiques 
of tobacco denormalization, which deem some strategies  
problematic and others acceptable. 
A. Tobacco Taxes 
New taxes may face political challenges, but so long as they 
are adopted by the proper government body using prescribed  
procedures, they are largely invulnerable to legal challenge.192  
Courts give broad deference to the political branches with respect 
to taxation, even in cases where the tax has an obvious regulatory 
purpose.193 
Tobacco taxes can be justified in economic terms.  If  
calculated correctly, taxes can force tobacco users to internalize 
costs that would otherwise be imposed on others.194  But  
 
190. Id. at 895-96. 
191. I will focus on Skrabanek and Epstein in particular because their work 
shares an emphasis on liberty largely untempered by concerns about equality and  
social justice.  Other scholars (see, e.g., Crawford, supra note 140 at 368; Freeman, 
supra note 141; Dworkin & Watts, supra note 140) have used the term healthism in 
the sense that Skrabanek used it, but have cautioned against the neoliberal emphasis 
on personal responsibility that Epstein and (to a lesser extent) Skrabanek have  
embraced. 
192. GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 36, at 279. 
193. Id. (citing License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. 462 (1866)). 
194. Id. at 276-78 (citing Adam J. Hoffer et al., Sin Taxes: Size, Growth, and  
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economically-minded libertarians question whether the  
externalities associated with tobacco use are overestimated.195  
They also point out that costs used to justify taxation and other 
tobacco control measures are artificially induced by publicly  
financed health care programs (for the elderly, disabled, and 
poor), laws that prohibit private health insurers from charging 
actuarially fair premiums, and other mechanisms that adopt a 
needlessly collective approach to health-care financing.196   
In addition to critiquing the economic unfairness of sin taxes,  
libertarians also critique the signal they send about the  
government’s moralistic disapproval. 
Roberts and Leonard do not discuss tobacco taxes directly, 
but their discussion of the federal tax on artificial tanning services 
provides a window into how they might view other public health 
taxes.  Their approval of the tanning tax hinges on their  
assessment that “people who use tanning beds have not been the 
subject of widespread animus or stigma on par with smokers or 
overweight people.”197  Presumably, then, tobacco taxes are more 
concerning from the egalitarian anti-healthist perspective. 
From a health justice perspective, the most concerning  
 
Creation of the Sindustry, MERCATUS CTR. (Feb. 5, 2013); see also William J. 
Baumol, On Taxation and the Control of Externalities, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 307, 308-09 
(1972); James R. Hines, Taxing Consumption and Other Sins, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 49, 
64 (2007). 
195. Skrabanek (1992), supra note 145. 
196. Epstein (2004), supra note 148, at 1463 (“Indeed today the major argument 
for extensive regulation of individual health practices comes from the government’s 
role as the insurer of (first and) last resort . . . .  [T]he government . . . has no  
willingness to impose explicit conditions that exclude people for dangerous habits (e.g., 
skydiving) or charge them differential rates for smoking or obesity . . . .  [T]he best 
course would be to weaken the public safety net that induces harmful individual  
behaviors in the first event, and to replace it with a system of tailored disincentives 
that do not encroach on individual liberty.” ); Richard A. Epstein, Subrogation, and  
Insurance, with Special Reference to the Tobacco Litigation,  N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. , 496-
97 (“[G]overnments, both state and federal, have proved utterly incapable of  
administering and controlling their Medicare and Medicaid budgets. . . . The more 
inept the management of these programs, the more substantial the recoveries they . . . 
obtain from the tobacco companies for tobacco-related illnesses . . . .  [I]t will . . .  be 
said that Medicare and Medicaid are different because federal obligations mandate 
that states expend their resources to counteract the harmful effects of smoking. . . . 
The obligation . . . takes the form of another unfunded mandate. Surely the right  
answer is for the states and the federal government to work their disagreements out 
between themselves.  It is not to export them onto tort defendants.”).  See also Lindsay 
F. Wiley, Micah L. Berman & Doug Blanke, Who’s Your Nanny? Choice, Paternalism 
and Public Health in the Age of Personal Responsibility,  41 J. L. MED. & ETHICS S88 
(2013). 
197. Roberts & Leonard, supra note 23, at 904. 
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feature of tobacco taxes is not the government’s promotion of a 
particular notion of the good life.  If the choice to disapprove of 
tobacco use is made through fair and transparent democratic  
procedures, it represents the prerogative of the community to  
signal its values and promote its preferred way of life.  The impact 
of taxes on tobacco users as such is also unconcerning.  On the 
other hand, their regressive nature is problematic from a social 
justice standpoint.198 
B. Product Regulation 
Direct regulation of tobacco products as the agent of disease 
is constitutionally permissible so long as it is rationally related to 
the government’s legitimate purpose of reducing tobacco  
consumption.199  It raises considerable concerns from a libertarian 
anti-healthism standpoint, but is relatively unproblematic from 
my health justice perspective or in terms of Roberts and Leonard’s 
anti-healthism principle because it does not affect the social  
status of tobacco users in any way. 
The fact that the most prominent regulation of tobacco  
products is focused on restricting the use of flavorings that  
increase the appeal and perceived appropriateness of the products 
for children raises an interesting issue for libertarian  
antihealthism.  Are government efforts to promote an “ideology” 
of healthy living more or less objectionable when they target  
minors?  The typical libertarian argument against government 
paternalism toward children is that it unnecessarily (maybe even 
harmfully) supplants parental responsibility.  That argument has 
less force with respect to tobacco given that few, if any, parents 
would express a preference for their children to use tobacco.   
Perhaps the more attractive argument is that efforts to protect 
children (who have limited autonomy anyway) also affect adults 
(whose autonomy should be paramount).  While the candy-and 
dessert-flavored tobacco products permitted under current law 
are not favored by the majority of adults, some adults do choose 
to use them.200  Thus, there is reason to believe that adult tobacco 
 
198. GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 36, at 278-79. 
199. Because distinctions between tobacco products and other products are not 
constitutionally suspect, the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection and due  
process require only that the regulation of tobacco products be rationally related to a 
legitimate government purpose and reducing tobacco use is widely recognized as  
legitimate.  See supra Part III.A. 
200. See Wayne & Connolly, supra note 50, at i34-i35 (Table 2) (highlighting the 
“significant appeal” of flavored products for 18-24-year-old smokers). 
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users are harmed by the flavor bans that are in effect. 
Roberts and Leonard do not address tobacco product  
regulation, but their discussion of the portion rule for sugary 
drinks adopted by the New York City Board of Health in 2012 
(and invalidated by the state’s supreme court on state  
administrative law grounds shortly thereafter) is instructive.  
They note that “[w]hile the Big Gulp ban might promote healthy 
decision-making by creating incentives to reduce consumption of 
sugary beverages . . . it does not clearly produce positive effects, 
including positively impacting the range of available choices,  
lowering health risks or costs, or facilitating better health 
care.”201  The fact that their analysis is reduced to a calculation of 
the likely effectiveness of this regulation of products and retailers 
suggests that their egalitarian anti-healthism principle is not  
doing much work here that could not be done as well or better by 
widely accepted public health ethics frameworks or the  
administrative law requirements that eventually spelled the  
intervention’s demise in the courts.202 
From a health justice perspective, product regulations are a 
crucial component of the facilitating social-ecological strategies 
that should take precedence over individually targeted behavioral 
strategies.  The problem with flavor bans from a health justice 
standpoint is that they do not go far enough.  The fact that  
menthol-flavored products, which the industry has used to target 
Black consumers for decades, enjoy protected status under federal 
law is evidence of exactly the kind of racial and economic bias that 
health justice demands attention to. 
C. Counter-Marketing 
Government sponsored speech does not raise constitutional 
concerns, even when it is funded by taxes paid by the industry it 
seeks to denigrate.203 Counter-marketing campaigns that  
denigrate the tobacco industry may be problematic from the  
libertarian anti-healthism standpoint, while those that seek to 
denigrate tobacco users raise concerns under all of the extralegal 
 
201. Roberts & Leonard, supra note 23, at 904. 
202. See Lindsay F. Wiley, Sugary Drinks, Happy Meals, Social Norms, and the 
Law: The Normative Impact of Product Configuration Bans, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1877, 
1888 (2014); Lindsay F. Wiley, Deregulation, Distrust, and Democracy: State and Local 
Action to Ensure Equitable Access to Healthy, Sustainably-produced Food, 41 AM. J. L. 
MED. 284 (2015). 
203. GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 36, at 142 (citing R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. 
Shewry, 423 F.3d 906 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
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frameworks discussed above. 
From the libertarian anti-healthism perspective,  
counter-marketing campaigns that focus on tobacco users would 
seem to be a prime example of government endorsement of a  
tobacco-free lifestyle as socially desirable.  Skrabanek and  
Crawford repeatedly expressed concerns that healthism was  
inappropriately tinged by the supposed moral superiority of  
individuals who adopt healthy behaviors.  Even campaigns that 
focus solely on demonizing the tobacco industry are probably  
objectionable to libertarians, though some ultimately defer to  
government’s freedom to express its own point of view in the  
marketplace of ideas as a less restrictive alternative to  
advertising and product regulations, which they find far more  
abhorrent. 
Counter-marketing campaigns that target the tobacco  
industry and tobacco products are generally consistent with the 
health justice perspective, especially those that focus on revealing 
and remedying industry practices that target racial, ethnic, and 
sexual minorities.  Counter-marketing campaigns that associate 
tobacco use with negative cosmetic and social consequences 
should be carefully assessed, but are largely acceptable.  The bias 
that they generate against smokers does not amount to true 
stigma.  As Burris notes: 
 
One could argue that smokers are not really  
relegated to a “them” status, that smoking does not 
supplant all other traits and is not automatically or 
durably associated with a range of negative  
stereotypes.  Or one could argue that it satisfies all 
the criteria of stigma in a formal way, but that in 
none of the domains is the effect serious enough to 
rise to the level of stigma.204 
 
More systematically, Bayer has argued that tobacco  
denormalization involves “marginalization that can be shed,” that 
“permits, even [ ] as its goal, the reintegration of those who have 
been shamed.”205  Thus, it may be appropriate if its public health 
benefits outweigh its costs.206 
Roberts and Leonard do not address counter-marketing  
 
204. Id. at 187. 
205. Bayer (2008), supra note 34, at 470. 
206. Id. 
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campaigns, but they might view campaigns focusing on  
undesirable social and cosmetic consequences of tobacco use with 
suspicion.  Does the fact that such campaigns are less common 
with respect to other risky activities (such as adventure sports or 
alcohol use) indicate that they are prompted, at least in part, by 
animus against tobacco users?  I think not, but I also disagree 
with Roberts and Leonard’s similar assertion about the role of  
animus against smokers as a motivation for employment  
discrimination.  I agree that such campaigns deploy social  
shaming, but unlike Roberts and Leonard, I feel it is important to 
distinguish between acceptable uses of shame and those that  
exacerbate true stigma. 
D. Advertising Restrictions 
The Supreme Court’s evolving jurisprudence regarding First 
Amendment protection for commercial speech has put advertising 
restrictions at risk in recent years.207  Thus far, federal  
restrictions on tobacco advertising have largely been upheld.208  
But some state and local restrictions have been invalidated by the 
courts on the grounds that they impermissibly infringe upon the 
First Amendment rights of tobacco companies and sellers.209   
Evidence regarding the efficacy of advertising restrictions is  
crucial to litigation over their constitutionality.  Under the  
heightened standard of review the courts now apply to restrictions 
on commercial advertising,210 regulators must establish that each 
restriction directly advances an important government interest. 
Few judges question the importance of reducing tobacco  
consumption,211 but many are skeptical about the incremental, 
population-level effects of restrictions.212 
Interestingly, while advertising restrictions are the most 
problematic denormalization strategy from a constitutional 
standpoint, they are in many ways less concerning than other 
strategies from the standpoint of the extralegal frameworks  
presented in this article.  Perhaps surprisingly, Epstein has noted 
exactly this contradiction, in the context of a case upholding state 
 
207. GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 36, at 453-57. 
208. Id.  
209. Id. at 455 (discussing Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001)).  
210. Id. 
211. Id. at 456 (discussing Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) 
(Thomas, J., concurring)). 
212. Id. at 454-56.  
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restrictions on gambling advertising: 
 
It is better that people not gamble, not only for their 
own personal character, but also for the corrosive 
effect gambling has on family and business  
obligations.  Nonetheless, it is just too costly to try 
to control gambling by criminal sanctions. Better 
therefore to legalize the “disfavored” activity, which 
can then be taxed to keep participation within  
reason.  Disfavored activities, moreover, need not 
be treated like all other business activities.   
Advertisement stimulates business, so it might be 
proper for a state to decide that, while it should not 
ban gambling, it should nonetheless moderate its 
growth by banning advertising. Surely if the issue 
were the legalization of marijuana and other drugs, 
a respectable argument could be made to allow 
their sale, subject to a general tax and to  
prohibitions or restrictions on advertising, which, 
because of advertising’s public visibility, should be 
reasonably easy to enforce.  In effect we have 
adopted such a strategy with respect to cigarettes, 
which are sold, heavily taxed, and subject to  
advertisement restrictions, at least on television 
and radio.213 
 
Roberts and Leonard do not take a particular position on  
advertising restrictions, but applying the factors they articulate, 
one could easily defend such restrictions as “[p]romot[ing] healthy 
decisionmaking, . . . [l]ower[ing] health risks, [and] [l]ower[ing] 
health-care costs.”214  Advertising restrictions do not draw any  
obvious distinction based on health behavior, nor does this appear 
to be an intervention that is “driven by animus, [s]tigmatizes  
individuals unfairly, [p]unishes people for their private conduct, 
[i]mpedes access to health care, [c]uts off resources or otherwise 
limits the ability to adopt healthy life choices, [p]roduces worse 
health outcomes, or [m]aintains or increases existing  
disparities.”215  Advertising restrictions are also appropriate from 
a health justice perspective.  They alter the social and cultural  
 
213. Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the  
Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 65-66 (1988). 
214. Id. at 895-96. 
215. Id. at 895. 
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environment in which choices about tobacco use are made, rather 
than targeting individuals directly. 
E. Warning Mandates 
All four frameworks can be used to draw a rough distinction 
between mandates to provide straightforward information about 
product ingredients and the health risks associated with tobacco 
use and those that associate tobacco use with negative cosmetic 
and social consequences.  The Supreme Court’s Zauderer  
precedent carves out an exception to heightened review for  
mandates to disclose “purely factual and uncontroversial  
information.”216  How far this exception extends is a matter of  
ongoing disagreement among the lower courts.217  Roberts and 
Leonard characterize public health interventions that “educate or 
. . .  better inform the public of the risks”218 as socially beneficial 
and therefore acceptable.  They do not address graphic warnings 
that (like counter-marketing campaigns) associate tobacco use 
with socially and cosmetically undesirable consequences, but (as 
with counter-marketing) one could imagine that labels emphasiz-
ing bad breath or impotence would meet their working definition 
of stigmatizing.  They could also be concerned about the possible 
role of animus in prompting these kinds of government-mandated 
messages.  From a health justice standpoint, warning mandates 
of all types are acceptable to the extent that tobacco use is not 
truly the object of stigma.  If, however, warning labels were 
adopted that sought to associate tobacco use with other  
stigmatized traits, such as gender nonconformance, that could be 
problematic. 
F. Smoke-Free Laws 
Bayer and Burris both focus considerable attention on 
smoke-free laws.  Consistent with the notion that denormalization 
of tobacco use is not identity spoiling and encourages  
reintegration, rather than permanent marginalization, Bayer 
concludes that laws prohibiting smoking in public places involve 
“segregation that is demeaning but not degrading,” and  
 
216. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 
U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
217. GOSTIN & WILEY, supra note 36, at 449-52. 
218. Roberts & Leonard, supra note 23, at 893 (critiquing excise taxes on sugary 
drinks and artificial tanning services for failing to educate or better inform the public 
of health risks). 
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separation that is “temporary rather than enduring,”219 
The impact of smoke-free housing laws, particularly as  
applied to publicly assisted housing, on those who are unable to 
quit smoking is concerning from the health justice perspective 
even if (as Burris argues) tobacco use is not the object of true 
stigma.  Such laws adopt a behavioral approach—punishing  
individual smokers without necessarily making it easier to quit—
toward current smokers.  Roberts and Leonard express similar 
concerns, noting that “for any paternalistic policy designed to  
encourage healthy decision-making to be fair and effective,  
individuals must have the ability to actually make better  
decisions [and t]here are good reasons to doubt that that is always 
the case.”220 
On the other hand, unlike either version of anti-healthism, 
health justice demands attention to the needs of nonsmokers, as 
well as smokers, particularly with respect to low-income  
housing.221  Smoke-free laws represent a social-ecological strategy 
with respect to those who are trying to quit or have not yet started 
smoking.  They alter the social environment in a housing  
development, reducing exposure to smoking as a normal activity 
and reinforcing nonsmoking as the dominant social norm.  A  
commitment to health justice—which emphasizes the priority of 
facilitating social-ecological interventions over individually- 
 
219. Bayer, supra note 34, at 470. 
220. Roberts & Leonard, supra note 23, at 893. 
221. ChangeLab Solutions, Smokefree Housing Ordinance: A Model California 
Ordinance Regulating Smoking in Multi-Unit Residences (June 2015), 
http://www.changelabsolutions.org/publications/model-ord-smokefree-housing 
[https://perma.cc/VS47-92RS] (“By adopting laws eliminating exposure to secondhand 
smoke in people’s homes, communities can ensure that smoke free living is not a  
luxury but instead made available to all residents, regardless of their economic means, 
race, or ethnicity.”); Amy K. Olfene, Of Asthma and Ashtrays: Examining the Rights of 
and Exploring Ways to Protect Maine Tenants Living in Multi-Unit Rental Housing 
Who are Involuntarily Exposed to Secondhand Tobacco Smoke in Their Homes, 66 
MAINE L. REV. 292, 294 (2013) (noting that “72% of Maine adults choose to ban  
smoking in their own homes, but only 47% of Maine tenants report living in a rental 
building that prohibits smoking.  Thus, not surprisingly, although the majority of 
Maine households have adopted voluntary smoke-free policies, low-income individuals 
continue to be exposed at much higher rates than the general population.”);  
Non-Smokers’ Rights Association, Smoking & Health Action Foundation, Smoke-Free 
Affordable Housing: Picking on Poor People or a Case for Social Justice? (2010), 
http://www.smokefreehousingny.org/wp-content/uploads/Case-for-Social-Justice.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R93N-P8EA] (“there remains an acute shortage of multi-unit  
buildings for people who need or want to live smoke-free.  This is the case for  
Canadians seeking market rate rental housing, and especially so for those who cannot 
afford market rate and must rely upon affordable housing.”). 
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targeted behavioral interventions222—would suggest that  
prohibitions on smoking in public housing facilities may be  
acceptable if they are preceded by supportive interventions to  
ensure adequate access to cessation services and social support.  
Roberts and Leonard’s focus on protecting “meaningful choices”223 
raises intriguing possibilities in this regard, but it is not yet  
sufficiently fleshed out to provide a useful framework for  
supporting a smoke-free ban if adequate supports for smokers are 
in place while rejecting it if they are not. 
G. Discrimination against Tobacco Users 
Permitting or encouraging private discrimination against  
tobacco users—whether in employment, insurance, or housing—
would seem to be the most problematic form of tobacco  
denormalization from the standpoint of all four of the frameworks 
presented here.  But the devil is in the details. 
From a legal standpoint, firing, or refusing to hire an  
employee based on off-the-job tobacco use is prohibited in about 
half of states.224  These antidiscrimination laws are justified in 
terms of egalitarian and libertarian concerns.  On the other hand, 
employer-sponsored wellness programs, which may create a  
hostile work environment for employees whose behavior or status 
designates them as unhealthy, are not only permitted, but  
encouraged by federal regulatory exemptions and grant  
programs.225 
Roberts and Leonard argue that refusing to hire or firing an 
employee for tobacco use is unacceptably healthist because it 
“classif[ies] and subordinate[s] . . . employees based on legal  
conduct that tends to correlate with poor health.”226  Pointing to 
the “rarity of similar lifestyle discrimination policies targeting  
alcohol consumption or high-risk recreational activities (e.g., 
mountain climbing, racecar driving, scuba-diving, spelunking), 
which may present similar or greater threats to health and 
productivity,” they suggest that these laws may be based on  
animus (in addition to rational considerations regarding  
increased health care and productivity costs borne by  
 
222. See Wiley Obesity, supra note 165, at 131.  
223. Roberts & Leonard, supra note 23, at 894. 
224. Wiley Obesity, supra note 165, at 181. 
225. Wiley Access to Health Care, supra note 109, at 664. 
226. Roberts & Leonard, supra note 23. 
WILEYFINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/28/17  7:20 PM 
2017] TOBACCO DENORMALIZATION 249 
employers).227  They also suggest that “hiring bans . . . stigmatize 
nicotine users . . . by reducing them to [a] single characteristic 
[ ]—. . . nicotine use . . . —without regard for their other attributes 
that could make them good employees.”228  They note that bans 
on off-the-job smoking “denies . . . wages to pay for health care 
out-of-pocket, as well as the benefits of employer-provided  
wellness programs, which—perhaps ironically—frequently  
include tobacco-cessation” and thus, “cut off resources and limit a 
person’s ability to adopt healthier life choices.”229  Finally, they 
note that 
 
Shutting nicotine users . . . out of employment may 
paradoxically produce a healthier workforce but a 
less healthy overall population. In addition, because 
people of color, people with disabilities, and lower-
income individuals are more likely to use nicotine . . .  
nicotine-use . . . bans disproportionately affect these 
groups’[,] potentially perpetuating existing health 
disparities.230 
 
Roberts and Leonard also express discomfort with insurance 
premium surcharges for tobacco users, noting that lawmakers 
might allow the surcharges “as an incentive for tobacco users to 
quit,” but “instead smokers faced with medium or high penalties 
chose to forgo coverage altogether to avoid elevated premiums.”231 
On the other hand, Roberts and Leonard hold up employer-
sponsored wellness programs that offer rewards for participating 
in a smoking cessation program as “an easy case of a non-healthist 
policy that discriminates based on health status.”232  Their  
approval turns on the notion that workplace wellness programs 
“typically offer a range of supportive services, funded fully or  
partially by the employer, including individual coaching, support 
groups, web-based tracking and support, and smoking cessation 
drugs.”233  They caution that such programs “should be carefully 
designed to avoid stigmatizing participants,”234 but the strategies 
 
227. Id. at 896. 
228. Id at 897. 
229. Id. 
230. Id. 
231. Id. at 894. 
232. Roberts & Leonard, supra note 23, at 900. 
233. Id.at 900-01. 
234. Id. at 901. 
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they suggest for avoiding stigma—“requir[ing] employers to  
permit workers time away from work duties to participate or  
publically recognized quitting milestones to the employee  
community”235—bear little relationship to health-related stigma, 
as sociologists have described it.  Elsewhere, they note that “it 
remains to be seen whether [workplace wellness programs that 
rely on biometric screenings to assess weight, blood pressure,  
cholesterol, etc.] actually lower costs, reduce risks, or produce  
better health outcomes,” cautioning that “perhaps the law should 
be agnostic with respect to such initiatives, at least until  
empirical evidence is clearer.”236  While supportive, participation-
based smoking cessation programs get their seal of approval, 
other workplace wellness programs run afoul of their egalitarian 
anti-healthist principle. 
The health justice approach, informed by the work of Burris 
and Bayer on health-related stigma would question, in the first 
instance, whether tobacco use is the object of true stigma (as  
discussed above).  Where true stigma is at issue—as I have argued 
is the case for wellness policies that target individuals based on 
body mass index—the strategies suggested by Roberts and  
Leonard do not respond to health justice concerns.  Time away 
from work to change the targeted behavior (e.g., to attend weight 
loss or smoking cessation seminars) would do little to combat 
stigma.  Public recognition of those who have disavowed the  
targeted status or behavior and may actually exacerbate the 
stigma surrounding it.237 
Assessing workplace wellness programs from the libertarian 
anti-healthist perspective is more difficult.  Roberts describes  
employer-sponsored wellness programs as healthist in the  
“traditional” (what I refer to as libertarian) sense.238  However, 
Epstein (whom I classify as a libertarian anti-healthist) has  
written favorably of “differential premiums for smokers and non-
smokers” which “would create incentives to reduce the level of 
smoking, and . . . reduce any implicit subsidy that nonsmokers are 
forced to pay for the benefit of smokers.”239  More generally, he 
has argued that if “more health costs [are] privately borne, most 
individuals will take more care to avoid illness and injury than 
 
235. Id. 
236. Id. at 903. 
237. Wiley Obesity, supra note 165; see also Wiley Access to Health Care, supra 
note 109, at 640. 
238. Roberts (2012), supra note 23, at 1171. 
239. Epstein (1997), supra note 142, at 498. 
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before.”240 Skrabanek, who died in 1994, did not have occasion to 
comment on such programs, but could conceivably have taken  
issue with corporate nannies just as he did with government  
nannies. 
V. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS 
At its core, the egalitarian anti-healthism principle put  
forward by Roberts and Leonard is an antidiscrimination  
principle.  The various factors they use to distinguish good  
health-related discrimination from bad health-status  
discrimination boil down to consideration of whether there is  
discriminatory (or animus-based) intent and whether there is a 
discriminatory (or disparate) impact, mixed with a little cost- 
benefit analysis.241  Their groundbreaking work evaluating the 
discriminatory intent and impact of interventions purportedly 
aimed at improving health provides fertile ground or further  
exploration.  It offers an egalitarian counterweight to the  
libertarian critiques that have dominated discussions of public 
health policy. 
On the other hand, the egalitarian anti-healthism principle 
is insufficient, by itself, to inform a thorough evaluation of some 
kinds of public health intervention.  The limitations of the anti-
discrimination principle are the subject of voluminous literature. 
Barring animus as a motivation for state action has not been a 
terribly successful strategy for policing the boundaries of  
government authority.  Animus is notoriously difficult for  
challengers to prove.  Disparate impact may be susceptible to  
objective proof, but many judges and lawmakers have deemed its 
use as a legal standard over-inclusive.242  Cost-benefit analysis is 
well established as a tool for assessing the acceptability of  
regulatory interventions.  Public health ethics and statutory  
regulatory impact analysis requirements already provide ample 
support for assessing the likely impact of a public health  
intervention on health outcomes, health care access, and costs. 
The antidiscrimination principle put forward by Roberts 
works well when it is applied to employers’ decisions about whom 
to hire and fire and insurer’s decisions about whom to insure and 
at what rate.  It accurately describes the ACA’s efforts to  
 
240. Richard A. Epstein, Living Dangerously: In Defense of Mortal Peril, 1998 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 909, 918 (1998). 
241. Weeks & Leonard, supra note 23, at 862. 
242. Id. at 857. 
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constrain risk-based underwriting. In turn, the ACA’s constraints 
on risk-based underwriting increase the motivation for employers 
to engage in health-status discrimination—in their hiring and  
disciplinary practices, and by using workplace wellness programs 
to create a workplace environment that is hostile to unhealthy 
employees.  Roberts’s proposal that existing prohibitions on  
discrimination by employers and insurers should be broadened 
and new prohibitions should be adopted to protect individuals 
from discrimination on the basis of health status adds  
considerable value to ongoing debates about why certain health 
conditions should trigger a mutual aid response and how far that 
mutual aid response should extend. 
But anti-healthism as antidiscrimination may be too  
simplistic a principle to provide useful insights regarding more 
complex matters such as taxes, advertising restrictions, and  
counter-marketing campaigns targeting products and services 
that have deleterious health effects, and prohibition of smoking 
(which is harms the health of bystanders as well as users) in  
designated places.  These policies may contribute to social  
exclusion of people whose conduct is perceived as unhealthy243 but 
it is difficult to prove that they are motivated by animus toward 
particular health-related behaviors.  The impact of these policies 
on health can be assessed individually (e.g. a smoker who spends 
significant income on cigarettes because he cannot or will not quit 
has less income to spend on other goods and services that could be 
beneficial for his health).  But as a policy matter, surely their  
effects should be assessed in the aggregate, at the population level 
(e.g., the deleterious impact of cigarette taxes on a tobacco user 
who cannot or will not quit is outweighed by the positive health 
impact of reducing the prevalence of smoking).  These  
interventions may have a disparate impact on people of color,  
people who live in low-income households, and people with low 
formal educational attainment.244  But, as Roberts and Leonard 
point out, those effects are addressed through principles that  
reject bias based on race, ethnicity, income, and education.245  
 
243. Notably, Roberts repeatedly distinguished between discrimination (a term 
she used to describe healthism) and social exclusion (a term she used to describe  
ableism) in her initial work applying her anti-healthism principle in the context of 
employment and health insurance determinations.  See Roberts (2012), supra note 23, 
at 1171, 1174.  
244. Roberts & Leonard, supra note 23, at 852. 
245. Id. at 856 (“Concluding that lifestyle discrimination, at least with respect to 
nicotine use and obesity, is normatively wrong primarily because it has a disparate 
impact on historically disadvantaged populations does not require . . . a new protected 
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Other frameworks, built on the general principles of public health 
ethics, are better suited to assessing the role that bias plays in the 
development and implementation of public health interventions 
and the distribution of benefits and burdens (including social  
exclusion) associated with those interventions. 
The Roberts and Leonard anti-healthism framework neglects 
analysis of the nature of the health-related conduct, trait, or  
status at issue and its relationship to individual identity. Unlike 
frameworks developed by Bayer, Stuber, Burris, and others, the 
Roberts and Leonard framework does not assess whether  
smoking, consumption of sugary drinks, rejection of vaccines,  
obesity, HIV-status, and other health-related behaviors and traits 
are—like religion and sexual orientation—“characteristics [that] 
are very difficult, as a practical matter, to change, or . . . are so 
fundamental to personhood that it would be abhorrent for  
government to penalize a person for refusing to change them.”246 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
category for the unhealthy. From this perspective, healthism is simply a new form of 
discrimination against already protected (to varying degrees of scrutiny) groups.”).   
Ultimately, however, they conclude that protections against people who are unhealthy, 
while more difficult to justify, are necessary to fully address their concerns. 
246. Id. at 844 (quoting Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(Norris, J. concurring)). 
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